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ABSTRACT 
This study presents a theory of dark network design and answers two 
fundamental questions about illuminating and interdicting dark networks: how are 
they configured and how are they vulnerable?  We define dark networks as 
interdependent entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit 
activities and employ operational security measures and/or clandestine tradecraft 
techniques through varying degrees of overt, or more likely covert, activity to 
achieve their purpose.  A dark network must design itself to buffer environmental 
hostility and produce output to achieve its purpose according to its design state.  
The level of hostility in the environment and the requirement for secure 
coordination of work determine the dark network’s design state.  These factors 
yield four typological dark network configurations: Opportunistic-Mechanical; 
Restrictive-Organic; Selective-Technical; and Surgical-Ad hoc.  Each 
configuration must allow the secure coordination of work between the dark 
network’s directional, operational, and supportive components and should adhere 
to the six principles of dark network design we identify: security, agility, 
resilience, direction setting, control, and capacity.  If a dark network’s 
configuration does not fit its design state or violates the principles of dark network 
design, the network will be vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.  
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If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain to be in 
peril…if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear 
the results of a hundred battles.1 
–Sun Tzu, 500 B.C. 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this study is to create a theory of dark network design.  
Dark networks are networks that must remain hidden in order to achieve their 
purpose. Dark network design refers to the process by which a dark network 
configures its structure, component parts and sub-systems, and coordinates its 
activities in response to environmental changes.2  While a wealth of literature 
from experts in the field of business management, such as Mintzberg and 
Galbriath, exists on designing and optimizing hierarchal organizations, there is 
little to no literature to help us understand dark network design.  This study seeks 
to fill the gap in the current literature.  In particular, we address two fundamental 
questions: 1) How are dark networks designed?  2) What are their 
vulnerabilities? 
Our theory is based on concepts derived from the field of organizational 
theory.  In particular, we use organizational design theory to identify two critical 
dimensions driving dark network design: the level of hostility in the environment 
and the requirement for secure coordination of work.  We posit that these two 
dimensions produce four dark network configurations or designs: Type-I: 
Opportunistic-Mechanical; Type-II: Restrictive-Organic; Type-III: Selective-
Technical; and Type-IV: Surgical-Ad hoc.  Using open source data, we identify 
examples of dark networks that are representative of each of the design states. 
                                            
1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
84. 
2  Derived from Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of 
Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 94. 
 2
We submit that each dark network design represents an ideal type that 
maximizes network output and minimizes the potential for interdiction.  To the 
extent a dark network does not configure itself to protect itself from hostility in its 
environment or it violates requirements for secure coordination of work, it will be 
vulnerable to interdiction. 
Studying networks that are designed to remain hidden using unclassified 
data presents some unique challenges.  In his paper Mapping of Networks of 
Terror Cells, Valdis Krebs encountered the same challenges that criminal 
network analyst Malcolm Sparrow found a decade earlier when applying social 
network analysis to criminal activity: incomplete data, fuzzy network boundaries, 
and the dynamic nature of networks.3  These problems are compounded when 
limiting research to open source data and keeping discussion of material at the 
unclassified level. 
However, keeping our study on dark networks unclassified with an 
unlimited distribution has its advantages.  Our conclusions are exportable to the 
classified domain and later can be operationalized by security services.  
Additionally, by avoiding discussion and specificity about operational tradecraft, 
we minimize the potential that dark networks could use our work to counter 
interdiction efforts.  And finally, an unlimited distribution allows others to continue 
this research in the hope that it ultimately leads to greater efforts to illuminate 
and interdict dark networks on a global scale. 
B. APPLICABILITY 
The first decade of the 21st century presented the United States and its 
global partners a wide array of complex security challenges.  Globalization and 
advances in technology have not only increased opportunities for peaceful 
growth and cooperation, but have also empowered an adaptive and resilient 
enemy that remains determined to use any means available to achieve its 
                                            
3  Malcolm K. Sparrow, "The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An 
Assessment of the Prospects," Social Networks 13 (1991): 251–274 and Valdis E. Krebs, 
"Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells," Connections 24 (2001): 43–52. 
 3
ideological objectives.  On September 11, 2001, Mohammed Atta’s Hamburg 
network, an affiliate of the al-Qa’ida social movement global Salafi jihad, 
launched the deadliest attack ever on American soil that became an iconic event 
in the protracted struggle between conventional superpowers and a dynamic 
transnational irregular threats.4  This dark network enabled 19 hijackers to defeat 
the elaborate security mechanisms of the United States and deliver a decisive 
blow to America by using airplanes as weapons of mass destruction.  In this 
deadly asymmetric attack, the hijackers killed close to 3,000 people in a matter of 
hours and arguably redefined the nature of warfare, as we know it.  Although the 
U.S. and its partners managed to topple the Taliban regime, the dark terrorist 
networks of al-Qa’ida and the global Salafi jihad persist today.  Dr. John Arquilla 
explained the resilience of terrorist organizations in his testimony before the 
House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities in 2008:5 
The terrorists remain on their feet and fighting, in large part 
because their nimble, networked structures have been given the 
opportunity to keep developing, their hallmarks being the 
decentralization of authority, the proliferation of small cells 
throughout the world, and an abundance of lateral links—many in 
cyberspace—among and between their many nodes. They have 
developed a highly evolved, battle-tested variant of the classic 
network concept of operations: ‘small pieces, loosely joined.’ 
Some nine years after the 9/11 attacks that triggered a vast expenditure of 
U.S. national treasure, President Barack Obama reaffirmed an ongoing U.S. 
                                            
4 According to Marc Sageman, al-Qa’ida has two dimensions: a social movement and an 
organization.  Al-Qa’ida a social movement for the global Salafi jihad that is composed of informal 
networks that mobilize people to resort to terrorism.  Al-Qa’ida as an organization makes 
reference to a formal structure of power, authority, and source of material support and tends to 
refer to “central leadership” that frames that strategic message and vision that provides direction 
and capacity for the global Salafi jihad.  See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004 and Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: 
Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008. 
5  John Arquilla, "It Takes a Network: On Countering Terrorism," United States House of 
Representatives, September 18, 2008, 
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC091808/Arquilla_Testimony091808.pdf (accessed 
October 20, 2010). 
 4
commitment to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida and its violent extremist 
affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world.”6  Like a malignant 
cancer, dark networks like al-Qa’ida continue to metastasize in the pursuit of their 
nefarious goals, all the while depleting the energies of the nations that oppose 
them.  A dark network of criminal organizations, violent extremist, state and non-
state sponsors of terrorism, and other illegal entities continue to identify and 
exploit vulnerabilities in their surrounding environment.7  Additionally, these 
entities build local, regional, and transnational alliances that yield a global dark 
network of state and non-state actors that could potentially wage “Unrestricted 
Warfare” against the United States and its allies.8  Although the United States 
undoubtedly considers itself the premier fighting force in the world, based on 
technological and firepower superiority, dark networks that have relatively few 
resources and limited technology continue to wear away American lives, national 
treasure, morale, and political will. 
We concur with network researcher Manuel Castells who states that 
“networks matter” because they are the underlying structure of our lives.9  
Through advances in technology, they allow social and knowledge networks to 
reconfigure themselves on a global-scale to permeate all domains of life, creating 
a networked society.  We also believe Castells’ argument is applicable to the 
                                            
6 Barack Obama, "National Security Strategy," The White House, May 27, 2010, 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss.../national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed May 28, 
2010).  
7 Dark networks have the potential to create or exacerbate unstable environments.  See 
Bryan Martin, Gabriel Szody and Joshua Thiel, Radical Destabilization: A Low Cost, High 
Success Policy Option for the United States, Master's Thesis (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2010). 
8  “Unrestricted Warfare” is modified combined warfare that goes beyond limits and is driven 
by the principals of omnidirectionality, synchrony, limited objectives, unlimited measures, 
asymmetry, minimal consumption, multidimensional coordination, and adjustment and control of 
the whole process. See Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, "Unrestricted Warfare," IWS - The 
Information Warfare Site, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/china/iw/unrestricted-warfare.pdf (accessed October 7, 
2009). 
9 Manuel Castells, “Afterward: Why Networks Matter,” in Network Logic: Who Governs in an 
Interconnected World?, ed. Helen McCarthy, Paul Miller and Paul Skidmore, 221–225 (London: 
Demos, 2004). 
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national security setting and is reflected in the works of RAND researchers John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt on the topic of “Netwar.”10  Network theories of 
Castells, Arquilla, and Ronfeldt support the nature of the global struggle against 
violent extremism and provide a basis for our claim that “dark networks matter.”  
While the U.S. cannot disregard the importance of remaining on the cutting edge 
of technology an innovating new strategies to wage conventional war with other 
nation states, recent history reveals that it is critical to have the capacity to 
identify, understand, and defeat dark networks that pose a threat to U.S. national 
security. 
C. THE NATURE OF DARK AND LIGHT NETWORKS 
1. Definitions 
To introduce dark networks and their domains, we begin with an overview 
of networks.  Networks are defined as “a set of actors connected by a set of 
ties.”11  They are “open structures with a set of interconnected nodes that are 
able to expand without limits, integrating new nodes as long as they are able to 
communicate within the network … [and] they share the same communication 
codes, such as values or performance goals.”12   
A network can consist of formal or informal ties between nodes.  These 
ties vary in type; examples include friendship or kinship ties, finance and 
business ties, etc.  A set of ties of a particular type, such as friendship or kinship, 
represents a social relation and each relation defines a different network.13  
                                            
10 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "The Advent of Netwar," RAND Corporation, 1996, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR789/ (accessed November 5, 2009) and John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy," 
RAND Corporation, 2001, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/ (accessed 
November 5, 2010). 
11 Stephen P. Borgatti and Pacey C. Foster, "The Network Paradigm in Organizational 
Research: A Review and Topology," Journal of Manangement 29, no. 3 (2003): 991-1013, 992.  
For the purpose of this study, we use the terms actors, nodes, and entities interchangeably when 
referring to individuals or collective groups that are parts of a network.   
12 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 
1996), 470. 
13 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 992. 
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Networks have a multitude of beneficial aspects and are undoubtedly the fabric 
of an interconnected society, but there are those actors that exploit the power of 
networks to achieve their illicit purposes.   
For the purpose of this study, we define dark networks as interdependent 
entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct activities that may be 
perceived as illegal by an external entity and employ operational security 
measures and/or clandestine tradecraft techniques through varying degrees of 
overt, or more likely covert activity to achieve a purpose.14  “Legality” is a matter 
of perception and can be interpreted differently by advocates or opponents of a 
dark network.  While a dark network that is conducting unilateral covert 
operations for reasons of national security may be legal in the eyes of the 
sponsoring nation, those actions may violate legal statutes or be perceived as 
illegal by opponents of the same dark network.  Because of its “illegal” nature, 
the dark network must become “invisible” to avoid illumination and interdiction.  
We do not use the moral or ethical justness of the network’s purpose to define its 
shade.  The battle between the forces of good and evil is problematic and 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Because they participate in clandestine and covert activity, dark networks 
have the following characteristics:15   
 
 
                                            
14 Raab and Milward define dark networks simply as “as simply “illegal and covert”,” as 
stated in Jorg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, "Dark Networks as Problems," Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 13, no. 4 (October 2003): 413–439. This definition is 
bounded and problematic because legality can be interpreted differently between the sponsor and 
the opponent of a dark network.  Furthermore, covert activity – hiding the sponsor of an act – is 
distinctly different from clandestine activity – hiding the presence of and act. For more information 
on the nuances of clandestine and covert activities, see James McCargar, "Part 1: Fundementals 
and Forms of Action," in A Short Course in the Secret War, 15–151 (Lanham: Madison Books, 
2001). 
15 Derived from Andrew R. Molnar, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. LeNoir, "Chapter 1: 
Underground Organization within Insurgency," in Human Factors Considerations of 
Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 17–35 (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 
1965). 
 7
• Their goals are often illegal under the system within which they 
exist or intend to operate; 
• Their activities may be either legal or illegal, but they tend to use 
illegal means to achieve their goals; 
• They attempt to conceal the identity of their members from the 
governing authority. 
Understanding how dark networks are configured to achieve their purpose will 
allow us to develop counter-network strategies to check their advances and take 
advantage of their vulnerabilities. 
In contrast to dark networks, light/bright networks are undeniably legal and 
can operate openly, with minimal security considerations.  Their legal status 
maximizes the potential for collaboration and minimizes the requirement for 
secure coordination of work.  A third type of network, which we identify as “gray 
networks,” is suggested in Dark Networks as Problems.  The authors Jorg Raab 
and H. Brinton Milward, found that dark networks are often connected to the legal 
networks that were trying to destroy them.16  These “gray” networks result when 
vetted-witting actors from dark networks use deception and elaborate security 
measures to misrepresent their true intent in order to manipulate unvetted-
unwitting actors of light/bright networks.17  Their domain thus consists of front 
organizations and other pseudo-groups that misrepresent their true intent to 
serve as platforms for dark networks to penetrate and exploit legal aspects of 
light/bright networks.18  They manifest themselves through a myriad of activities 
executed by state and non-state sponsored dark networks, such as organized 
                                            
16 Raab and Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” 413–439. 
17 By our definition, vetted actors are those actors that, through some process of validation, 
are perceived as “trusted agents” by entities within the network; and witting actors are those 
actors that have full knowledge of the true purpose of their actions.  Unvetted and unwiiting actors 
are the opposite. 
18 For more information on how pseudo-groups and pseudo-operations are conducted during 
for counter-insurgency operations, see Lawrence E. Cline, "Pseudo Operations and 
Counterinsurgency: Lessons from other Countries," United States Army War College Strategic 
Studies Institute, June 2005, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm?PubI D=607 
(accessed November 8, 2009) and Edgar A. Jimenez, James S. McCullar and Kevin M. Trujillo, 
Pseudo Operations and Deception in Irregular Conflict, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010). 
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criminal syndicates, insurgent groups, violent extremists, and transnational 
terrorist groups that infiltrate and exploit legal networks for nefarious purposes.  
Although the legal status of a network provides a broad criterion for determining 
the network’s “shade,” it does not offer the granularity required to determine 
network typology.  Next, we offer exogenous and endogenous dimensions that 
are useful in comparing and contrasting networks. 
2. Dimensions to Compare and Contrast Networks 
Two dimensions are useful in comparing and contrasting light/bright, gray, 
and dark networks: the level of hostility in the environment and the level of 
security required for the secure coordination of work.   
a. Hostility of the Environment 
Hostility of the environment is any external factor that can 
negatively affect the network in pursuit of its purpose.  In a business setting, 
Covin and Slevin found:19 
Hostile environments are characterized by precarious industry 
settings, intense competition, harsh, overwhelming business 
climates, and the relative lack of exploitable opportunities.  Non-
hostile or benign environments, on the other hand, provide a safe 
setting for business operations due to their overall level of 
munificence and richness in investment and marketing 
opportunities. 
A light/bright network faces a low level of hostility and is typically 
only concerned with surviving in the competitive market place and achieving its 
purpose.  Although the external environment can have negative affects on the 
network, the level of hostility is low when compared to that of dark networks.  
Dark networks must overcome the challenges that affect light/bright networks, 
plus the additional constraints of remaining hidden.  They not only have to remain 
competitive and achieve their purpose in a turbulent and precarious marketplace, 
                                            
19 Jeffrey G. Covin and Dennis P. Slevin, "Strategic Management of Small Firms in Hostile 
and Benign Environments," Strategic Management Journal 10 (1989): 75–87. 
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but also do so with the constant threat of destruction by external opposition 
elements, such as state security forces and rival networks.  A high level of 
hostility in the environment may not only keep a dark network from achieving its 
purpose, but could potentially destroy it.  
b. Secure Coordination of Work 
Secure coordination of work is the implementation of 
countermeasures to protect the network from outside threats as it directs its 
different components to achieve its purpose.20  Light/bright networks operate in 
an environment that is less hostile than that of their dark counterparts, thus they 
have low requirements for secure coordination of work.  On the other hand, dark 
networks have a high requirement for secure coordination of work and must 
exhibit clandestine and covert behavior to avoid illumination and interdiction by 
opposition elements.  Clandestine behavior, concealing the existence of an 
operation, and covert behavior, concealing the sponsor of an operation, requires 
dark networks to commit additional resources to establish structural and 
relational mechanisms that provide secure coordination of work.21   
3. Network Types 
Combining the two aforementioned dimensions, hostility of the 
environment and secure coordination of work, we can differentiate among the 
three types of networks: dark, light/bright, or gray. 
                                            
20  For further details on coordination of work, see Andrew H. Van De Ven, Andre L. Delbecq 
and Jr., Richard Koenig, "Determinants of Coordination Modes within Organizations," American 
Sociological Review (American Sociological Association) 41, no. 2 (April 1976): 322-338 and J. 
Michael Steele, "Models for Managing Secrets," Management Science (INFORMS) 35, no. 2 
(1989): 240-248. 
21 Techniques of clandestine and covert behavior drive organizational devices, patterns of 
communications, and rigid security procedures.  See Andrew R. Molnar, Jerry M. Tinker and John 
D. LeNoir, "Chapter 5: Clandestine and Covert Behavior," in Human Factors Considerations of 
Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 101–108 (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 
1965). 
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a. Dark Networks 
Dark networks are typified by a high level of hostility in the 
environment and a high requirement for secure coordination of work.  Members 
of dark networks are vetted and witting to the true nature of their illegal activities 
and the illegal status of the network.  
b. Light/Bright Networks 
Light/Bright networks are typified by a low level of hostility in the 
environment and a low requirement for secure coordination of work.  Hostility is 
low, but not absent.  Thus, light/bright networks may apply security measures to 
buffer hostility by making themselves a hardened target, but not to hide the 
presence of the network.  Actors in light/bright networks may be vetted or 
unvetted, and are witting to the true nature of their activities and the status of the 
network. 
c. Gray Networks 
Gray networks are products of the fuzzy domain where dark and 
light/bright networks interact.  Vetted-witting actors from dark networks use 
deception and elaborate security measures to misrepresent their true intent in 
order to manipulate unvetted-unwitting actors of light/bright networks.  Since gray 
networks are an evolutionary byproduct that occurs through the bridging of the 
potential space between light/bright and dark networks, they have the broadest 
range of possible external and internal situations. 
Because of their interconnectivity with dark and light/bright 
networks, gray networks may operate in a domain typified by a moderate-high 
level of hostility, but still have a moderate-low requirement for secure 
coordination of work based on the purpose and the of the network and its use of 
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advance technology.22  Gray networks of this domain tend to be technology-
based and exploit ill-governed/ungoverned spaces to avoid illumination and 
interdiction.23 
Likewise, a gray network can function in a benign environment, but 
still employ a moderate-low to moderate-high level for secure coordination of 
work to keep illicit activities hidden from unwitting members of the light/bright 
network and opposition security forces.24  Political and commercial fronts are the 
infrastructure that facilitates this exploitation of the licit world to support illicit 
activity.25  In the context of unconventional warfare, the underground and 
auxiliary elements of a resistance organization will develop gray networks in their 
organization and build-up phase to remain undetected while they build capacity 
                                            
22 For example, cyber-criminals that develop and employ cutting-edge techniques to 
embezzle funds through the surreptitious exploitation of a highly technical process that is 
extremely difficult to detect.  These crimes present a hostile environment due to their illegal 
nature, but may—at the time—require moderate-low secure coordination of work.  This is 
because the target of the cyber-attack or criminal investigators may be unaware that a crime was 
committed, or not have the capacity to detect and/or counter the technology used to conduct the 
crime. 
23 For more information on ill-governed and ungoverned spaces, see Angel Rabasa et al., 
"Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks," RAND, 2007, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009);  
Cristina Brafman Kittner, "The Role of Safe Havins in Islamist Terrorism," Terrorism and Political 
Violence 19, no. 3 (2007): 307—327; Anna Simons and Davis Tucker, "The Misleading Problem 
of Failed States: A 'Socio-geography' of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era," Third World Quarterly 
28, no. 2 (2007): 387—401; and  Prager Security International, Denial of Sanctuary: 
Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens, ed. Michael Innes (Westport: Prager Security International, 
2007). 
24 For example, social movements tend to operate within the legal framework to resolve their 
issues and voice their collective concerns in accordance within the accepted norms of society.  
This tends to form light/bright networks that become the legitimate face of defection from the 
status quo.  If the means or timeline for change does not satisfy the members that are highly 
committed to achieving the network’s purpose, splinter groups will form and form dark networks 
with a radical ideology.  These dark networks exploit the original movement and leverage it as a 
means of ideological and material support to conduct illegal activity and achieve a purpose.   
25 Islamists often use strategic communication to frame their ideology in a manner to evoke 
emotional support to their cause.  This sets the conditions for dark networks to use fronts to 
obtain active and passive support for the Salafi jihad.  For an example of this rhetoric, see Anwar 
al-Alwaki, "44 Ways to Support the Jihad," The Force of Reason, November 2009, 
http://theforceofreason.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/44-Ways-to-Support-Jihad.pdf 
(accessed June 2, 2010). 
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for the eventual overthrow of the standing government.26  The nature of the 
interwoven relationships of dark, light/bright, and gray networks is graphically 
represented in the nature of networks (Figure 1).  Although gray networks are 
problematic and present challenges to security and stability, they are not our 
focus in this study.  We focus on dark networks where the environmental hostility 
is high and there is a high need for the secure coordination of work. 
 
Figure 1.   The Nature of Networks 
D. IMPACT OF THE STUDY 
This study develops a theory of dark network design. Understanding how 
dark networks are designed, provides a conceptual construct for the interdiction 
                                            
26 The U.S. Department of Defense defines unconventional warfare (UW) as activities 
conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow and 
occupying power or government by operating through or with and underground, auxiliary and 
guerrilla force in a denied area.  Although theory on UW, counterinsurgency (COIN), and other 
forms of irregular warfare (IW) is beyond the scope of this study, we argue that current doctrine 
must take a network approach to understanding resistance warfare.  See Mark Grdovic, "SWCS 
PUB 09-1: A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare," United States Army John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, November 2009, 
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/Assets/SWCS%20Publications/Leaders%20Guide%20Final.pdf 
(accessed January 27, 2010 ) and Department of Defense, "Irregular Warfare: Countering 
Irregular Threats," Vers. 2.0, United States Joint Forces Command Joint Operating Concepts, 
May 17, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc2_0.pdf (accessed June 22, 
2010). 
 13
of malignant dark networks that pose a threat to global security.  Our theory also 
provides a basis for developing counter-networks to defeat traditional and 
irregular threats that are prevalent in today’s turbulent security environment.  
Developing these sanctioned clandestine mechanisms for covert action will allow 
us to adopt a proactive, rather than reactive, posture toward dark networks.  
Identifying and exploiting the vulnerabilities of an opposition dark network while 
simultaneously developing safeguards to mitigate vulnerabilities in our own 
networks epitomizes Sun Tzu’s tenant of knowing ourselves and knowing our 
enemy.  This study presents the theoretical framework for the deliberate design, 
analysis, and interdiction of dark networks.27 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II reviews the organization theory literature and provides the 
foundation of our theory of dark network design.  We derive concepts from the 
field of organizational design and current research on both light/bright and dark 
networks.  These fields of study enable us to outline two design challenges: 
protection against external hostility and coordination of work to achieve a 
purpose.  This body of knowledge informs our analytical framework for our theory 
of dark network design in the next chapter. 
Chapter III introduces our theory of dark network design.  First, we show 
how the relative hostility of the environment and the network’s requirement for 
the secure coordination of work determine its design state.  Second, we 
introduce our theoretical model that yields four design states and typological 
configurations of dark networks: Type-I: Opportunistic-Mechanical; Type-II: 
Restrictive-Organic; Type-III: Selective-Technical; and Type-IV: Surgical-Ad hoc.  
Third, we introduce our model that identifies the three fundamental components 
                                            
27 To learn more about the latest tools, concepts, and methodology for illuminating and 
interdicting dark networks, visit The Naval Postgraduate School Common Operational Research 
Environment(CORE) Lab (http://www.nps.edu/research/CoreLab/index.html); Palantir 
Technologies (http://www.palantir.com/); Steve Borgatti (http://www.steveborgatti.com/ and 
http://www.analytictech.com/ ); Pajek (http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/); and The 
Center of Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) at Carnegie 
Melon University (http://www.casos.ece.cmu.edu). 
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of a dark network: directional, operational, and supportive.  Fourth, we present 
the two challenges to dark network design: buffering hostility and coordinating 
work to produce output.  To overcome these challenges, dark networks strive to 
adhere to the six principles of dark network design: security, agility, resilience, 
direction setting, control, and capacity.  Finally, we will introduce our dark 
network system model that illustrates how a dark network coordinates work in a 
hostile environment to produce output and achieve its purpose. 
Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII present illustrative examples of each of our 
four dark network configurations.  These examples are Mara Salvatrucha-13 
(MS-13), The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Hezbollah, and the 
Hamburg network that conducted the 9/11 attacks.  We analyze against their 
design states and the principals of dark network design to identify potential 
vulnerabilities.  
Finally, Chapter VIII summarizes our theory of dark network design, 
provides recommendations for illuminating and interdicting dark networks, and 
offers areas for future research.  Undoubtedly, this study will generate more 
questions than it answers and will serve as a catalyst for further research to 
develop concepts related to network warfare.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I introduced the purpose and scope of the study, general 
concepts related to the nature of networks, and why dark networks matter.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to review pertinent literature on organizational design 
and network research in order to identify the basic elements of dark network 
design.  We begin with a review of literature to identify the basic features of 
organizational design.  Next, we summarize current bodies of knowledge 
pertaining to light/bright and dark networks that address their structure and 
relationships.  Finally, we identify gaps in the current literature on network 
design.   
B. ORGANIZATION DESIGN 
Organization design theory provides a starting point for the development 
of a theory of dark network design.  A premise of organization theory is that when 
people come together to achieve a common goal, they form an organization.  
According to Daft, organizations are: 1) social entities, 2) goal directed, 3) 
designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and 4) 
linked to the external environment.28  A variety of organizations exist, ranging 
from small and regional to large and multinational.  Daft states, “[the] key element 
of an organization is not a building or a set of policies and procedures; 
organizations are made up of people and their relationships with one another.”29  
Daft’s statement highlights the idea that an organization is the sum of all its parts:  
the people, their interactions (both with each other and with the environment), 
goals, customers, suppliers, processes, and policies—the list goes on.  Most 
                                            
28 Richard L. Daft, Organizational Theory and Design, 8th Edition (Madison: South Western 
Educational Publishing, 2003), 11. 
29 Daft, Organizational Theory and Design, 11. 
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importantly, Daft underscores the point that in order to survive, an organization 
must adapt and effectively design itself for its environment.30 
Organization design is defined as the “deliberate process of configuring 
structures, processes, reward systems, and people practices and policies to 
create an effective organization capable of achieving the business strategy.”31  In 
his “star model”, Jay Galbraith identifies five components of organization design:  
strategy, structure, processes and lateral capability, rewards systems, and 
people practices.  Strategy is the cornerstone of the design process and sets the 
organization’s direction through its vision, mission, market, and how the 
organization plans to compete within its market.  Structure determines formal 
power and authority, reporting relationships, and roles within the organization.  
Processes and lateral capability address the organization’s requirement for 
internal and external collaboration for information sharing and decision-making.  
Formal and informal networks, processes, teams, integrative roles, and matrix 
structures enable collaboration.  Rewards systems that are based on goals, 
metrics, and evaluations instill positive organizational values and behaviors that 
are recognized with compensation and other rewards.  People practices are the 
collective human resource that creates organizational capital and capacity.  
These include staffing and selection, performance feedback, and programs for 
learning and development.  The interconnected and mutually dependent 
relationship of Galbraith’s five components of organization design is depicted in 
the star model of organization design (Figure 2). 
                                            
30 Daft, Organizational Theory and Design, 13. 
31 Jay Galbraith, Diane Downey and Amy Kates, Designing Dynamic Organizations (New 
York: American Management Association, 2002), 2.  They further state that organization “design” 
is often incorrectly used synonymously with organization “structure”:  “The organization design 




Figure 2.   Galbraith Star Model of Organization Design.32 
This model demonstrates that organizational design is not as simple as 
“rearranging boxes on the organization chart.”33  It is important to note that 
organizational design is not organizational structure.  Organizational structure 
has three key components: (1) it designates formal reporting relationships, such 
as the organization’s levels of hierarchy, (2) it identifies the groupings of 
individuals and/or departments, and (3) it includes the systems necessary for 
effective communication, coordination, and integration amongst departments.34  
At the very basic level, and example of organizational structure is a company’s 
organization chart, while the organizational design is the dynamic combination of 
strategy, structure, processes, systems and people within the organization.35   
Galbraith’s heuristic star model shows that “just as in a living organism, if 
any of the components of the star are not attended to in the organization design 
                                            
32 Galbraith, Downey and Kates, Designing Dynamic Organizations, 2. 
33 Ibid., 2. 
34 Daft, Organizational Theory and Design, 86. 
35 Galbraith, Downey, and Kates, Designing Dynamic, 2. 
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process, the result is misalignment.”36  The consequences of misalignment can 
lead to confusion, friction, gridlock, internal competition, or poor performance and 
lead to unaligned organization design (Figure 3).  The lack of a clear strategy 
leads to confusion that makes people in the organization pull in different 
directions and does not provide a basis for making decisions.  If the structure is 
not aligned to the strategy, friction occurs leading to the inability to mobilize 
resources, ineffective execution, and loss of competitive advantage.  Gridlock 
occurs if the development of coordinating mechanisms is left to chance.  This 
leads to the lack of collaboration, prolonged decision and innovation cycle times, 
and difficulty with information sharing.  If the rewards system does not support 
the organization’s goals, internal competition occurs and ultimately leads to 
diffused energy, low standards, and turnover.  Finally, if people are not 
empowered, low performance permeates the organization that results in 
diminished results and low employee satisfaction.  Misalignment of the 
organization’s design yields less than optimum performance. 
 
Figure 3.   Unaligned Organization Design37 
                                            
36 Galbraith, Downey, and Kates, Designing Dynamic Organizations, 2–4. 
37 From Galbraith, Downey, and Kates, Designing Dynamic Organizations, 4. 
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Other models also take a configurational approach to organization design.  
In Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?, Henry Mintzberg found that all 
organizations have a natural configuration, each a combination of certain 
elements of structure and situation.38  He postulated that the purpose of 
configuration is to coordinate work and survive in a given setting.  The external 
environment drives the organization to adapt its configuration or change the 
environment to achieve the organization’s purpose.  If an organization has the 
proper structure to achieve its purpose in the wrong environment, the 
organization may work to change the environment and preserve its structure.  
Mintzberg explains:39 
Essentially, the organization has two choices.  It can adapt 
continuously to the environment at the expense of internal 
consistency-that is, steadily redesign its structure to maintain 
external fit.  Or, it can maintain internal consistency at the expense 
of a gradual worsening fit with its environment, at least until the fit 
becomes so bad that it must undergo sudden structural redesign to 
achieve a new internally consistent configuration.  In other words, 
the choice is between evolution and revolution, between perpetual 
mild adaptation, which favors external fit over time, and infrequent 
major realignment, which favors internal consistency over time. 
In a Darwinian sense, survival is contingent on the organization’s ability to 
understand its external environment and its internal structural and situational 
elements and find the appropriate configuration that fits its domain, or niche.  
Next, we will at some of the external and internal dimensions of organization 
design that affect configuration. 
1. External Dimension: The Environment 
Organizational researcher David Hanna posits that organizations are open 
systems that depend on their external environment for survival and are affected 
by influence and interaction with everything outside of its organizational 
                                            
38 Henry Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?," Harvard Business Review 59, 
no. 1 (January/February 1981), 103–116. 
39 Ibid., 115. 
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boundary.40  This boundary is semi-permeable to allow for interaction with the 
environment to decrease uncertainty within the organization so that it can find the 
right fit between internal structure and the external environment.41  The 
environment is all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization, 
which includes people, other organizations, social and economic forces, and 
legal constraints and has the potential to affect all or part of an organization by 
providing opportunities, or imposing demands and constrains.42  The sectors of 
the environment that directly impact the organization’s ability to achieve its ends 
are known collectively as the task environment and those sectors that indirectly 
influence the organization are part of the general environment.43  Uncertainty is 
the organization’s lack of information about the environment that leads to 
difficulty in predicting external changes.  Two dimensions of the environment 
determine the level of uncertainty: complexity and change.44 
a. The Simple-Complex Dimension 
The simple-complex dimension addresses environmental 
complexity.  Complexity refers to the number and dissimilarity of external 
elements relevant that interact with and influence an organization.  A simple 
environment may have as few as three or four similar external elements, while a 
complex environment will have more.  An insurgency model serves as an 
example to explain complexity in the environment for both the insurgents and the 
counterinsurgents.  From the perspective of the insurgents, a simple environment 
exists because the insurgents can conserve their resources and conduct decisive 
action on their terms to exploit the vulnerabilities of the state.  Typically, the 
insurgents have a better understanding of the state’s than the state knows about 
                                            
40 David P. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (Reading: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, 1988), 8–9. 
41 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, , 48–52. 
42 David Nadler, Michael Tushman and Mark B. Nadler, Competing by Design: The Power of 
Organizational Architecture (New York: Oxfor University Press, 1997), 29. 
43 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 47. 
44 Ibid., 52–53. 
 21
the insurgents.  The insurgent’s embeddedness in the population provides 
information superiority and decreases complexity.  On the other hand, the 
counterinsurgents face a complex environment because they not only have to 
counter the actions of the insurgents, but they must also address interests of the 
population, various tribal or communal factions, competing political groups, 
organized criminal entities, and the influence of external actors in the conflict.   
b. The Stable-Unstable Dimension 
The stable-unstable dimension addresses dynamic change in 
environmental domain.  A domain is stable if it remains the same over a period of 
months or years.  Alternatively, environmental elements will shift abruptly in an 
unstable environment.  An example of a stable domain would be a government 
that is well entrenched in society, exerts control over its sovereign territory, and 
maintains legitimacy in the eyes of a majority of the population.  Change is 
evolutionary and occurs slowly over time.  However, dynamic change creates an 
unstable environment and can occur when a government exerts little control over 
its territory and allows a multitude of competing interests to exert influence over 
the environment.  This dynamic, unstable environment sets the conditions for 
revolutionary change and insurrection. 
c. The Environment and Uncertainty 
As stated previously, uncertainty comes in the form of the 
organization’s lack of information about the environment.  The level of uncertainty 
is related to the degree of complexity and change in the environment.  
Complexity and change in the environment affects organizational uncertainty and 
options for configuration and governance.  Figure 4 illustrates how increasing 






uncertainty.  As environmental complexity and uncertainty increases there is a 
corresponding need for organizations to increase decentralization and 
differentiation.45   
(1) Level of Uncertainty 
(a)  LOW-LOW: This environment is also known as a 
simple-stable environment with a small number of external elements, all of which 
are similar, and the elements change slowly.  Examples include: soft drink 
bottlers, beer distributers, container manufacturers, and food processors.46  
(b)   LOW-HIGH: This environment is also known as a 
complex-stable environment.  In this environment there are a large number of 
external elements and those elements are dissimilar.  These elements change 
slowly over time or remain the same.  Examples include: e-commerce, fashion 
clothing, music industry, and toy manufacturers.47 
(c)  HIGH-LOW: This environment is known as a high-
moderate uncertainty environment.  This environment consists of small numbers 
of similar external elements in the environment, but these elements change 
frequently and unpredictably.  Examples include: universities, appliance 
manufacturers, chemical companies, and insurance companies.48  
(d)   HIGH-HIGH: This environment is known as a 
complex-unstable environment. This environment consists of a large number of 
dissimilar external elements which change frequently and unpredictably.  
Examples include: Computer firms, aerospace firms, telecommunications firms, 
and airlines.49 
 
                                            
45 Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” 116. 





(2) Configuration Options.  Complexity in the environment 
will determine the internal configuration of organizations.  In simple stable 
environments organizations tend to utilize a mechanistic organization system that 
entails a clear hierarchy of authority, formalized internal organizations with 
codified rules and procedures.50 In more dynamic environments organizations 
tend to toward an organic configuration, characterized by an adaptive, free 
flowing regulatory environment, with a decentralized authority structure.51 
(3) Governance Options.  Centralized organizations 
usually keep decision-making tied to a small cadre of individuals.  This form of 
organizational governance is best for smaller organizations in simple 
environments.  As organizations grow and environments become more complex, 
central leadership cannot effectively govern, and thus must decentralize authority 
to in order to adapt.52    
 
Figure 4.   The Environment and Uncertainty53 
                                            
50 Daft, Organization Theory and Design,143.  
51 Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 148. 
52 Steven McShane, Mary Ann Von Gilnow, Organizational Behavior Essentials, (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, 2007), 237. 
53 Erik Jansen, "MN3121: Organizational Design for Defense Analysis" (Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, Fall Term 2009). 
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In the next section, we discuss the Mintzberg configurations 
that rely heavily on their fit with the environment.  The configuration’s fit is directly 
related to level of complexity and stability in the environment.  In a simple-stable 
environment, organizations are highly centralized and mechanistic.  As the 
environment becomes more complex and dynamic, organizations become 
decentralized and organic to accomplish tasks.  Thus, as the environment 
changes, the organization must adapt accordingly if it is going to efficiently 
coordinate work to achieve its purpose.  In sum, the organization must be as 
dynamic as the task environment to achieve a proper fit.   
2. Internal Dimension: Configuration 
One concept presented by both organization and network experts is the 
importance of the role played by the environment in determining the configuration 
of an organization or a network.   
a. Configuration 
In the organizational sense, we define configuration as the visible 
manifestation of an organization’s structural arrangement designed to achieve a 
purpose. 
b. Mintzberg’s Organizational Configurations 
Organizational theorist Henry Mintzberg found that the 
characteristics of organizations fall in to natural clusters based on external and 
internal factors; these clusters yield seven natural organizational configurations 
that he described in terms of structure and situation: entrepreneurial, machine, 
professional, diversified, innovative, missionary, and political.54   
(1) Entrepreneurial.  Entrepreneurial organizations are 
simple, informal, flexible, and have little staff or hierarchy.  The organization’s 
                                            
54  For detailed information on each of the Mintzberg configurations, see Henry Mintzberg, 
Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations (New York: The Free 
Press, 1989), 93–300. 
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power and authority resides with the chief executive who represents the 
organization’s strategic apex and typically manages through direct supervision.  
These organizations fit in the simple-unstable environment and are highly agile 
because of their centralized management and organic structure. 
(2) Machine.  Machine organizations are centralized, 
bureaucratic, and rely on standardization of work processes to coordinate work.  
They rely on formal procedures, specialized and division of work, functional 
grouping, and extensive hierarchy.  These organizations fit the simple-stable 
environment and are representative of mass services industries and 
governmental organizations. 
(3) Professional.  Professional organizations are 
decentralized bureaucracies that depend on the standardization of skills to 
coordinate work.  The organization relies on the knowledge and skills of its 
professionals to produce output within the framework of the organization.  These 
organizations fit the complex-stable environment and are exemplified by 
universities, hospitals, and other field that require technical expertise. 
(4) Diversified.  Diversified organizations–also know as 
divisional organizations–are market-based sub-components that are semi-
autonomous mechanistic bureaucracies.  Coordination is achieved through 
standardization of outputs and direction setting by middle managers.  These 
organizations fit in the simple-stable environment and are typified by large 
corporations that produce a variety of products or across a geographically 
disbursed market. 
(5) Innovative.  Innovative organizations, which Mintzberg 
also refers to as adhocracies, are fluid, organic and selectively decentralized 
organizations that rely on subject matter experts to tackle complex projects.  




and rely on a bottom-up process of discovery to reach a resolution.  These 
organizations coordinate work through mutual adjustment and fit in the complex-
unstable environment. 
(6) Missionary.  Missionary organizations are directed by 
their adopted ideology that is grounded in a rich sense of values and beliefs and 
framed by charismatic leaders of the organization.  The ideology provides a clear 
mission that inspires its members to pull together and coordinate work through a 
standardization of norms.  Religious organizations are often, but not exclusively, 
missionary in nature and see a rise in their membership when the environment is 
complex-unstable.  When a person feels the environment is uncertain and 
hostile, they tend to turn to religion to find answers.  Mintzberg identifies three 
forms of missionary organization:  
• Reformers, those who what to change the world directly; 
• Converters, those who want to change the world indirectly; and 
• Cloisters, those who do not seek to change the world, but to allow 
their members to pursue a unique lifestyle 
(7) Political.  Political organizations are focused on 
power, as opposed to structure.  Politics tend to contradict coordination and 
cause disorder and disintegration within and organization.  Generally, political 
organizations are focused on self-interests and cause the organization to pull 
apart.  Mintzberg identified four forms of political organization: 
• Confrontation, conflict that is intense, confined, and brief; 
• Shaky alliance, where conflict is moderate, confined, and possibly 
enduring; 
• Politicized organization, conflict that is moderate, pervasive, and 
possible enduring; and 




c. Components of Configurations 
In Mintzberg on Management, the presented the six basic parts 
(components) that are the building blocks of an organization’s configuration: 
strategic apex, support staff, technical support, middle line, operating core, and 
the organization’s ideology.55   
(1) The Strategic Apex.  The strategic apex is the top 
management and overseas the whole organization.   
(2) The Middle Line.  As the organization grows, the 
middle line becomes the link that ensures the work of the operating core is 
nested with the direction and vision of the strategic apex.   
(3) The Operating Core.  The base of the organization is 
the operating core and consists of the workers that produce the organization’s 
products and render its services. 
(4) The Technostructure.  The technostructure performs 
the administrative and technical duties to plan and control the work of others.   
(5) The Support Staff.  The support staff executes the 
day-to-day internal activities that supports the organization as a whole and 
indirectly supports the output produced by the operation core.   
(6) Ideology.  Finally, the organization’s ideology, 
directed by the strategic apex, defines the purpose of the organization and 
encompasses the traditions and beliefs that form the skeleton that guides all 
activities of the organization.  Coordination mechanisms describe how the 
components of an organization coordinate their work. 
d. Design Elements of Configurations 
(1) Structural Design Elements.  Structural design 
elements are: specialization of tasks, formalization of procedures, formal training 
and indoctrination needed for the job, grouping of units, size of the units, action 
                                            
55 Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management, 95–115. 
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planning and performance control systems, liaison devices, vertical 
decentralization, and horizontal decentralization. 
(2) Situational Design Elements.  Situational elements 
are: an organization’s age and size, technical system, internal and external 
environment, and distribution of power.   
(3) Coordination Mechanisms.  According to Mintzberg, 
coordination mechanisms are the most basic elements of structure and are the 
glue that holds and organization together.56   He identifies six key means of 
coordination:  mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardization of work 
processes, standardization of outputs, standardization of skills, and 
standardization of norms.  No organization can rely on one coordination 
mechanism, but some are optimum depending on the stage of the organization’s 
life, its purpose, or its environment.   
e. Summary of Configuration 
Although Mintzberg’s configurations are based on hierarchal 
organizations that operate in the light/bright world and do not directly export to 
network design, his premise that an optimal configuration is determined by the 
nature of the task environment is applicable to dark networks.  In their thesis 
Counter-Organization Targeting: Theoretical Framework for Analysis, Daoust and 
Osborne applied Mintzberg’s theory and applied it to a hierarchical insurgent 
organizational model to indicate which insurgent tasks fit into which basic 
component (Figure 5).57  Although their model depicts a hierarchal organization, 
it helps define organizational elements related to direction, operations, and 
support that will be addresses later.  Furthermore, the model illustrates the 
complexity of a hierarchal organizational structure based on its environment. 
 
                                            
56 Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management, 101. 
57  Daniel C. Daoust and Joseph E. Osborne, Counter-Organization Targeting: A Theoretical 
Framework for Analysis, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1996). 
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Figure 5.   Mintzberg’s Components Applied to an Insurgent Organization58 
Organization design literature reveals that the way and organization 
configures itself to coordinate work according to its environment determines its 
ability to achieve its purpose in an efficient manner.  When the organization’s 
design does not fit with environment, it is inefficient and will waste time, 
resources, and is likely to fail to achieve its purpose.  Relationships and structure 
enable the coordination of work.  Next, we will examine current literature on 
network research to gain a better understanding of how light/bright, gray, and 
dark networks configure themselves in terms of the nature of relationships and 
structure to coordinate work in order to achieve a purpose. 
C. NETWORK LITERATURE 
As discussed in Chapter I, the nature of a network is based on its legal 
status and can be described as light/bright, dark, or when interconnected–gray.  
A light/bright network is overt and is able to maximize collaboration because it 
operates within the “legal framework of the states they act in.”59  On the other 
                                            
58 From Daoust and Osborne, Counter-Organization Targeting, 62. 
59 Raab and Milward, "Dark Networks as Problems," 4. 
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hand, dark networks are sometimes illegal and, whatever their ethical status,  
must adopt clandestine and covert behavior to avoid illumination by opposition 
elements seeking to destroy them.  They operate in a hostile environment and 
that is inherently inefficient because of the tradeoff of secrecy and capacity to 
achieve its purpose.  Where the two meet is the ambiguous domain of gray 
networks that is characterized by a continuous state of deceptive behavior by 
dark networks to manipulate light/bright networks.  According to Milward and 
Raab, “legal and illegal networks sometimes come together in a gray zone or 
they are confronted with the fact that what is legal in one country is illegal in the 
other.”60  Understanding the nature of a network is important for understanding 
the manner that it achieves it purpose. 
1. Basic Features of Networks 
To get a better understanding of how a purpose is achieved using the 
networked, vice hierarchical, form of organization, we will review the work 
network researcher Patti Anklam in her book Net Work: A Practical Guide to 
Creating and Sustaining Networks at Work and in the World.  While the studies of 
networks can be an abstract concept and problematic, Anklam provides key 
features for understanding networks.  She argues that networks are complex 
adaptive systems of human relationships and that everyone in the network 
influences the outcome of the network.  If it’s a network, you can draw it, it has 
and underlying purpose, and it creates value.  Furthermore, all networks have a 
discernable purpose, structure, and leadership style.61  Anklam’s insight help us 
look at the world through the network lens to see how network assets, facets, 
relationships, structure, governance, and design collectively interact to create 
value  
                                            
60 Raab and Milward, "Dark Networks as Problems," 5. 
61  Patti Anklam, Net Work: A Practical Guide to Creating and Sustaining Networks at Work 
and in the World (Burlington: Elsevier Inc., 2007), 4–7. 
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a. Network Assets 
A network creates value through its relationships that are generated 
by the network’s tangible assets known as capital and is responsible for 
achieving the network’s intangible asset: purpose.  The network produces value 
in the form of social capital that results from the interaction of the network’s 
human, structural, and relational capital.  Human Capital is derived from the 
knowledge, skills, and experience of the individuals required to provide solutions 
to customers.  Structural Capital is produced as part of the network’s internal 
procedures, processes, and internal organizational structures that have evolved 
to enable the organization to function as it does.  Relational Capital is the value 
of a network’s relationships with its customers, suppliers, and others it engages 
with to accomplish its business.  Finally, the resulting Social Capital is the stock 
of active connections among people; the trust, mutual understanding, and shared 
values and behaviors that bind the members of human networks and 
communities and make cooperative action possible. 
b. Network Facets 
Network assets enable the four facets of networks: purpose, 
structure, style, and value.  Purpose is what animates a network and causes its 
members to care about it.  Structure reflects a network’s form, the possible 
patterns and arrangement of the relationships; the assignment of roles and 
responsibilities within the networks; and the network’s texture in terms of 
flexibility, strength, and density of social bonds.  Style is the network’s visible 
manifestation; the nature of the interactions in the network; its social climate, 
which includes culture, core values, and norms; the manner of interactions; the 
balance of its orientation towards results or discovery; and its leadership style.  
Purpose, structure, and style produce value: the tangible and/or intangible 
network output in direct alignment with its purpose.  The assets and facets of 




Figure 6.   Assets and Facets of Networks62 
c.  Network Relationships 
Social capital is contingent on the strength of relationships in the 
network to make cooperative action possible.  The legal nature of light/bright 
networks allows them to build a robust set of ties in order to maximize 
collaboration and efficiently coordinate work to produce value and achieve a 
purpose.63  
(1) Formal and Informal Ties.  Relationships are 
measured by analyzing the formal and informal ties between actors, or nodes, 
based on similarities (location, membership, and attribute), social relations 
(kinship, other role, affective, and cognitive), interactions, and flows of tangible 
                                            
62 From Anklam, Net Work, 17, 30. 
63 The field of social network analysis often uses mathematical computations to determine a 
network’s structure and assumes that interpersonal ties matter because they transmit behavior, 
attitudes, information, or goods.  While techniques for using social network analysis to illuminate 
and interdict dark networks is beyond the scope of this study, social network theory provides an 
important foundation for understanding the nature of relationships in networks.  Wouter de Nooy, 
Andrej Mrvar and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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and intangible assets.64  In deeper detail, Everton finds that actors are linked 
together by ties that vary by their type and strength and include ties of sentiment 
(friendship, liking, respect); resources (business transactions, financial flows); 
association or affiliation (members of the same church, club, etc.); behavior 
(communication); geographic movement (migrations, physical mobility); status 
movement (social mobility); physical connection (road, river, or bridge connecting 
two points); formal ties (organizational hierarchy); and biological ties (kinship).65  
Using social network analysis tools, such as UCINET, Pajek, ORA and Palantir, 
analysts can measure and interpret the pattern of relationships of networks.66  
Common social network analysis measures (Table 1) are important for 
understanding the actor’s place in the network.  For light/bright networks, these 
measures are valuable for understanding information flow and identifying formal 
and informal leaders within the group and determining critical nodes related to 
the coordination of work.  Similarly, these same measures can be used for 
illuminating and interdicting dark networks by identifying potential cut-points that 










                                            
64  Stephen P. Borgatti, Ajay Mehra, Daniel J. Brass and Giuseppe Labianca, "Network 
Analysis in the Social Sciences," Science 323, no. 5916 (February 2009): 892-895. 
65  Sean F. Everton, Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks Using Social 
Network Analysis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 12. 
66 For more information on UCINET, Pajek, and ORA, see http://www.analytictech.com/, 
http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/, http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/, and 
http://www.palantirtech.com/government respectively. 
67  Kathleen M. Carley, Ju-Sung Lee and David Krackhardt, "Destabilizing Networks," 
Connections 24, no. 3 (2001): 31-34. 
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Table 1.   Sample of Network Measures Used in Social Network Analysis68 
Network Measures 
Density The total number of ties within a network divided by the total 
possible number of ties 
Degree 
Centrality 
The count of the number of an actor’s ties. 
Closeness 
Centrality 
Based on the path distance, measures how close, on the 
average, each actor is to all other actors in the network. 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Measures the extent to which each actor lies on the shortest 
path between all other actors in the network. 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
Assumes that highly central actors are more important than ties 
to peripheral actors, so weights and actor’s summed ties to other 
actors by their centrality scores. 
 
(2) The Strength of Weak and Strong Ties.  The strength 
of relationships, or ties, affects social capital.  Mark Granovetter found that 
“weak” ties are more important that strong ties in terms of information flow 
because individuals with only a few weak ties will be deprived of information from 
distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the provincial views of 
their close friends and isolate them from the latest ideas that exist beyond their 
current clique.69  Alternatively, David Krackhardt argues to the contrary that 
strong philos (Greek for friend) ties are important because they “constitute a base 
of trust that can reduce resistance and provide comfort in the face of 
uncertainty.”70  He adds that philos relationships are developed through 
interaction, affection, and time.  Although weak ties may allow for better 
information flow, strong ties are crucial for network resilience and stability in the 
face of a volatile situation.  Social capital built on trust ensures network 
 
 
                                            
68 Everton, Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks, 109–125. 
69  Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited," Social 
Theory I (1983): 201-233. p. 202. 
70  David Krackhardt, "The Strength of Strong Ties: The importance of Pilios in 
Organizations," in Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action, 216-239 (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1992). pp. 218-219. 
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survivability and the persistent pursuit of achieving a purpose.  Another concept 
related to social capital the nature of an actor’s strong and weak ties is that of 
structural holes.   
(3) Structural Holes.  Burt defines a structural hole as a 
relationship of non-redundancy between two actors that acts as a buffer to 
provide network benefits that are in some degree additive rather than 
overlapping.71  A structural hole is related to efficiency of the network and is tied 
to Granovetter’s theory on the strength of weak ties, both of which are applicable 
to relationships and structure in light/bright, gray, and dark networks.  Next we 
will examine features of light/bright network structure.   
d. Network Structures 
Network structure is defined as the form and possible patterns and 
relationships within the network and includes the assignment of roles and 
responsibilities as well as the nature the social bonds of a network: the flexibility, 
strength and density.72  In discussing network operational structures, John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt describe three fundamental forms of network 
structure that are based on how nodes interoperate with each other: 1) the chain 
network, where communications and resources must travel through intermediate 
nodes; 2) the star or hub network, where a set of actors are tied to a central actor 
or node and all communications must go through that actor; and 3) an all-channel 
or full-matrix network in which all the nodes are interconnected (Figure 7).73  
These basic network structures are often blended to in varying degrees to form 
hybrid network structures depending on the nature of the task environment.   
                                            
71  Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 65. 
72 Anklam, Net Work, 30. 
73 Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 7–8. 
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Figure 7.   Basic Network Structures74 
e. Network Governance 
Anklam found that all networks have some form of governance, 
explicit or assumed, that keeps the organization in balance and relationships 
intact and is necessary for steering a steady operational state.75  Management of 
membership is a critical governance task because it ultimately can shape the 
nature of the network’s relationships, structure, and size.  Anklam describes 
three types of network membership: open, criteria-based, and invitation-only.76  
These types of membership are applicable to all “shades” of networks. 
(1) Open Membership.  Open membership establishes 
norms and assumes that only those that have a serious intent on sharing the 
network’s purpose will participate and that actors will contribute to in accordance 
with the purpose of the network.  It is the least restrictive (least secure) of the 
three memberships and has the potential of creating the most “weak” ties.  As 
mentioned earlier, weak ties are important for the dissemination of information 
                                            
74 After Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 7–8. 
75 Anklam, Net Work, 59. 
76 Anklam, Net Work, 68–72. 
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beyond and actor’s normal sphere of influence.  These tend to produce mass-
networks with limited control measures in order to maximize collaboration and 
are essentially “leaderless”.77   
(2) Criteria-Based Membership.  A network that is 
criteria-based establishes a minimum criterion for membership based on some 
attribute that is aligned with the purpose of the network.  This may be profession, 
education, income, religion, ethnicity, gender, etc.  Because members share 
some common attribute, they may form “strong” ties because of a shared 
relationship or interest and therefore build a baseline of trust.78  These tend to 
have moderate control measures and reflect the norms of its membership.  
Criteria-based networks can be the optimum platform for developing gray 
networks based on the shared attributes between actors in the licit and illicit 
world as described in Chapter I.  Additionally, the affinity between actors that are 
tied by similar attributes provides an inherent level of trust and acts as a means 
of security for a dark network and is a critical aspect of clandestine and covert 
behavior.  This creates an environment that is conducive for identifying members 
that may be susceptible for recruitment into invitation-only networks. 
(3) Invitation-Only Membership.  The most restrictive—
and most secure—type of membership is by invitation-only.  This closed network 
is suited for maintaining the nature of interaction of members of the group with 
outside entities.  This provides a level of secrecy and protection from outside 
influence and typically has some method of vetting to verify the trustworthiness of 
invited members.  A greater level of trust leads to greater access to critical 
information and can has the potential of moving an actor from the periphery 
(edge) of a network to its core (center).  The concept of invitation-only 
                                            
77 Technology has given rise to a host of decentralized communities that are tied by a 
common purpose without any central leadership, such as peer-2-peer networks and other entities 
that rely on a sense of trust and community.  See Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The 
Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations (New York: 
Penguin Group, 2006). 
78  Stephen P. Borgatti and Daniel S. Halgin, "Analyzing Affiliation Networks," Steve Borgatti, 
ed. P. Carrington and J. Scott, 2004, http://www.steveborgatti.com/papers/bhaffiliations.pdf 
(accessed November 05, 2009). 
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membership based on a vetted level of trust is key for understanding how dark 
networks securely recruit new members from light/bright world and incrementally 
give them access to compartmented plans and operations. 
f. Network Design 
Network design is the process of creating structures and processes 
to produce value.  According to Anklam’s network growth model (Figure 8), 
networks proceed through adaptive phases that define its purpose, structure, and 
style in order to produce value.  The four phases of the network growth model 
are: creation, design, growth, and performance.79  Creation and design can be 
intentional by a centralized top-down process or it may be by discovery through a 
decentralized, bottom-up process.  Network creation by intention or discovery is 
contingent on a shared interest or clear purpose between the members of the 
network.  In the design phase, the networks defines and frames its purpose, 
identifies stakeholders, builds relationships, establishes structure and 
governance, defines membership criteria and norms, determines tempo, and 
establishes physical and virtual presence.  During the growth phase, the network 
builds capabilities, capital, creates connections, and ties members to achieve the 
network’s purpose and establish core values.  The network maintains its tempo 
and equilibrium during the performance phase by coordinating work and 
adjusting to changes in the task environment.  This growth cycle produces a 
dynamic situation that enables network resilience during turbulent times. 
                                            
79 Anklam, Net Work, 132–134. 
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Figure 8.   Growth Model for Networks80 
Our understanding of network assets, facets, relationships, 
structure, governance, and design collectively interact to create value provides 
the foundation for understanding dark network design. 
2. Dark Networks 
The rise of the information age and the era of globalization has changed 
the environment in which war is fought.  Dark networks, undergrounds, and any 
sort of clandestine or covert organization, face a conundrum.  In order to achieve 
an objective, the network must become both expansive and aggressive.  But in 
order to survive, they must take precautions and prize their security.  Network 
patterns and size must be juggled so as to achieve an optimum balance between 
the need to expand and the need to maintain security.  As McCormick and 
Owens found, the effectiveness of an underground organization is a function of 
operational capacity and security; performance depends on the organizational 
size and level of coordination; and its goal must be to achieve the highest 
operational impact given the competing and simultaneous need to maintain 
                                            
80 From Anklam, Net Work, 133. 
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security.81  A dark network maintains security by adhering to rules governing the 
nature of relationships to securely coordinate work.  When properly designed, the 
structure of the network is a mechanism that regulates and mitigates the 
exposure of critical information that if disclosed, can lead to network illumination.  
Illumination can have potentially fatal consequences for the dark network.  Thus, 
we identify two dimensions to understand dark networks: the level of hostility in 
the external environment and the requirement for secure coordination of work.   
a. External Dimension: Hostility of the Environment 
The hostility of the environment affects several characteristics of 
the network’s configuration.  The legal status of a network can be directly 
correlated with the risk of reprisal for the network’s purpose and/or activities.  
When opposition entities have the will and capacity to counter a dark network’s 
illegal actions, the operational risk increases. 82 Hostility directly affects the 
network’s dimensions related to the nature of relationships, attribution of 
activities, coordination of work, and the nature of governance (Figure 9).  The mix 
of possible network characteristics depends on the network’s purpose and its 
task environment. 
                                            
81  G. H. McCormick and G. Owen, "Security and Coordination in a Clandestine 
Organization," Mathematical and Computer Modeling, no. 31 (2000): 175-192. 
82  Doctrinal definitions for permissive, uncertain, and hostile operational environments are 
available at Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, April 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ (accessed October 26, 2010). 
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Figure 9.   Network Characteristics Based on Hostility 
(1) Low-Hostility Environment.  A low-hostility 
environment is typically the domain of light/bright networks because of the licit 
nature of their activities.  They operate in a low-risk environment that requires 
minimal security measures to protect against hostility.  Relationships can be 
overt in nature; activity can be fully attributable to the network; coordination of 
work can maximize collaboration; and the network has the option to adopt a 
centralized form of governance. The low-hostility environment favors 
collaboration and connectivity, but is susceptible to penetration by dark network 
actors. 
(2) Moderate-Hostility Environment.  A moderate-hostility 
environment is typically the domain of gray networks as described earlier in 
chapter I.  It is the domain that alerts us to the first manifestation of clandestine 
and covert behavior.  Gray network operate in a moderate-hostility environment 
that requires moderate security measures.  Relationships can be confidential in 
nature, but attribution of activity tends to be deceptive in nature.  While there may 
be an outward appearance of legality, this is often a false front to cover illegal 
activity and intent.  The coordination of work becomes restrictive in nature to 
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prevent compromise of the dark network’s true intent to unvetted-unwitting 
members of the gray network.  To offset the need for security, the networks may 
employ a decentralized form of governance to accomplish activities and prevent 
compromise.  The uncertain environment represents a careful balance of security 
and capacity. 
(3) High-Hostility Environment.  A high-hostility 
environment is typically the domain of dark networks because of their 
requirements for clandestine and covert behavior.  Networks operate in a high-
risk environment that requires strict security measures to protect against high 
hostility.  Relationships are usually clandestine in nature and activity is covert in 
nature until the act is claimed by the directional component through strategic 
communications.  The coordination of work becomes compartmented in nature to 
prevent compromise of the dark network in line with the “fail-safe” principle, 
which will be discussed later.  Information is on a strict need-to-know basis and 
members are constantly vetted for trustworthiness.  Increased security may 
transform governance from a decentralized to leaderless.  In “Leaderless 
Resistance,” Louis Beam postulates that an organization is leaderless when “all 
individuals and groups operate independently of each other, and never report to 
a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction, as would those 
who belong to a typical pyramid organization.”83  A leaderless network tends to 
be difficult to illuminate and interdict because of the lack of ties between entities 
within the network united by a shared ideology, as opposed to a physical 
connection. 
b. Internal Dimension: Secure Coordination of Work 
A network’s ability to sufficiently coordinate work in a secure 
manner relative to the hostility in the environment is typically dependent on 
learning tradecraft skills, or what Andrew Molnar identifies as clandestine and 
                                            
83 Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” The Seditionist, No. 12, February 1992, 
http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm (accessed February 10, 2010). 
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covert behavior.84  Clandestine behavior “consists of actions in which the 
underground member endeavors to conceal his involvement.  Covert behavior 
attempts to conceal and cover the underground activities from observation.”85  
Organizational practices, such as false fronts, records, and communications can 
all disguise operations.  In essence, an underground has to adjust its activities 
depending on the environment in which it operates – this is the necessity for the 
secure coordination of work.   
Operating in a hostile environment is inherently inefficient.  Bell 
found that a hostile environment creates obstacles for communication between 
various levels of coordination, but the coordination is necessary for efficiency.86  
An “inverse ratio exists between secrecy and efficiency; absolute secrecy 
guarantees that nothing works properly.”87  The requirement for secrecy 
complicates all aspects of operation, especially in the area of command and 
control.  Additionally, “the revolutionary ecosphere assures survival at the cost of 
competency.”88  The fact that most rebels want to someday assume the status of 
the state, most insurgents do not have the incentive to truly learn the craft of 
being in the underground that will create vulnerabilities in the network.   
Underground organizations are dark networks and have the 
following characteristics: their goals are often perceived as illegal by the 
governmental entities they seek to overthrow; their activities are generally both 
legal and illegal; their members usually play legal roles within the society, with 
their underground membership concealed.  Undergrounds, licit or illicit, must 
                                            
84 Tradecraft is the application of various techniques can be employed to achieve secrecy.  
See Christopher Felix, A Short Course in the Secret War (New York: Madison Books, 2001), 54. 
and  Arthur S. Hulnick and Daniel W. Mattasusch, "Ethics and Morality in U.S. Secret 
Intelligence," in Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional, ed. Jan Goldman, 
520-521 (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2006). 
85 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, “Underground Organization within Insurgency,” 17–35. 
86 J. Bowyer Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld:  Covert communications and Rebel 
Ecosystem,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 3, no 1 (1990), 17–18. 
87 Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld: 15–43, 17. 
88 Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld: 15–43, 18. 
 44
always preserve their clandestine nature for survival.  Although Molnar’s study 
focused on underground organizations in insurgencies and revolutions from a 
hierarchal perspective, the characteristics are applicable to the study of dark 
networks when viewing his findings through the network lens.  The requirement 
for self-preservation while accomplishing a goal in the face of environmental 
hostility lends itself to varied dark network configurations based on the network’s 
goals and environmental conditions. 
(1) Relationships.  Theories and concepts related to 
relationships in light/bright networks are applicable to dark networks, but take on 
a higher priority to provide secrecy and prevent network illumination and 
interdiction.  The requirement for secure coordination of work drives clandestine 
and covert behavior to hide illicit operations and keep the network invisible.  
Molnar found that human inadequacy presents the most danger in clandestine 
operations and one of the most critical areas of underground work is teaching 
members to maintain silence – unguarded conversation leads to compromise of 
the clandestine organization.89  Strict rules governing communication and 
operational security measures give members direction and provide a set of 
techniques to maintain security.  Parallel secure communication, operational, 
intelligence, and support channels are established in a manner that follow a “fail-
safe” principal so that if one element fails or is compromised, the consequences 
to the network will be minimal.90   
From a relational standpoint, a dark network can be 
considered a closed, invitation-only group that operates in an environment that is 
inherently inefficient and relies on trust, weak ties, and structural holes to 
maintain secrecy.  Potential and existing members of the network must adhere to 
strict rules of clandestine and covert behavior and live in a state of perpetual 
                                            
89  Andrew R. Molnar, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. LeNoir, "Chapter 5: Clandestine and 
Covert Behavior," in Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 101–108 
(Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1965), 105. 
90  Andrew R. Molnar, William A. Lybrand, Lorna Hahn, James L. Kirkman and Peter B. 
Riddleberger, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, 
D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), 54–55. 
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operational testing to vet loyalty and validate trustworthiness for greater access 
to network secrets.91  Strong ties between actors illuminates the network and 
makes it vulnerable to interdiction.  Conversely, weak ties and structural holes 
create compartmentalization and reduce the chance of compromise.  As we will 
discuss next, the proper structure of a dark network, along with deliberate 
shaping of relational ties, optimizes secure coordination of work to prevent 
compromise and achieve the network’s purpose. 
(2) Structure.  Raab and Milward state that networks are 
“coordination devices used for the benefit of the people.”92  However, further 
study highlights that these light/bright networks, used for benefit, have parallels 
with “networks and actors that pursue criminal ends.”93  They must adopt a 
flexible structure to enable them to react quickly to changing pressures from 
external entities and hostility in the environment in order to survive.  Typically, 
dark networks tend to revert to physical force and coercion to achieve their 
goals.94  Because of this necessity to protect their organizational structure and 
remain secret and control its members, dark networks must devote resources to 
enable the network’s capacity for secure coordination of work.  Next, we will 
examine how dark networks configure themselves to enable secure coordination 
of work by employing structural security measures. 
(a) Security Measures.  Reflecting on the basic 
network structures presented by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, a dark network 
incorporates additional mechanisms in order to fit the environment in which it 
                                            
91  Validation of loyalty, trustworthyness, and adherence to rules of clandestine and covert 
behavior is a constant process, which is detailed in Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, "Clandestine and 
Covert Behavior." 
92 H. Brinton Milward and Joerg Raab, "Dark Networks as Problems Revisited: Adaptation 
and Transformation of Islamic Terror Organizations since 9/11," University of Southern California, 
September 29, 2005, 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/private/documents/bedrosian/dark_networks.pdf (accessed 
August 4, 2010), 6–7. 
93 Milward and Raab, "Dark Networks as Problems Revisited," 7. 
94 Ibid.,7. Milward and Raab present four main propositions to guide further research on the 
subject of dark networks.  The preceding information summarizes Proposition 1 and Proposition 4 
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operates.  One such security mechanism is a cut-out, or intermediary.  A cut-out 
can be a person or an event that acts as an intermediary between two actors or 
between two events creating a channel for clandestine impersonal 
communications (Figure 10).95  Cut-outs can hide network relationships from 
analysts using social networking software by creating weak ties and structural 
holes that affect network measures scores which can inhibit identification of key 
players in the network.   
 
 
Figure 10.   Illustration of Cut-out/Intermediary Visualized in Palantir 
 A cut-out is an additional security measure that 
augments the basic network structures as a means to conduct secure 
coordination of work within the network (Figure 11).   
                                            
95 Christopher Felix, A Short Course in the Secret War, New York: Madison Books, 2001, 41. 
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Figure 11.   Basic Network Structures with Cut-outs96 
(b) Fail-safe structures. In his study of insurgent of 
underground networks, Andrew Molnar found that the cellular structure and 
compartmentalization of information provided fail-safes that provided security and 
allowed the insurgency to achieve its purpose in the face of hostility.97  The 
foundational construct of the underground insurgent network is the operational 
cell.  The operational cell is composed of a leader and a few cell members 
operating directly as a unit.  They collect money, distribute propaganda and carry 
on the necessary political functions of an underground.  The intelligence cell 
usually conducts the most sensitive missions.  This cell is unique in that the cell 
leader seldom comes into direct contact with the members of the cell and the 
members are rarely in contact with each other.  The main characteristic of this 
cell is the high degree of compartmentalization and its use of indirect 
communication.  The auxiliary cell is commonly found in front groups or in 
sympathizers' organizations.  The auxiliary cell contains an underground cell 
leader, assistant cell leaders, and members.  The auxiliary cell differs structurally 
                                            
96 After Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, "Underground Organization within Insurgency." 
97 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, "Underground Organization within Insurgency."  
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from the operational cell in that it is normally larger in size, has an intermediate 
level of supervision, and has little or no compartmentalization.98 
(i) Parallel Workflow.  Parallel workflow 
is frequently set up to support a primary cell.  These cells are often arranged as 
an alternate or redundant mechanism in case the primary cell is compromised.  
This not only offers protection, but is also a means of redundancy within the 
network.  An operational branch leader could direct multiple operational cells to 
conduct simultaneous operations against the same target, while each cell is 
unwitting of the other cells existence (Figure 12).  Likewise, working through a 
series of cut-outs, an intelligence branch leader could direct multiple intelligence 
cell members to gather information on the same target, or each other (Figure 13).   
 
 
Figure 12.   Operational Cells in Parallel Visualized in Palantir.99 
                                            
98 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, “Underground Organization within Insurgency,” 20–21. 
99 After Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, "Underground Organization within Insurgency." 
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Figure 13.   Intelligence Cells in Parallel Visualized in Palantir.100 
(ii) Serial Workflow. Serial workflow is a 
form of sequential interdependence commonly found in supply chain networks 
that relies on the exchange of resources in a manner where one element’s output 
is passed on to become the input of another element’s process.101  Cells in 
Series can be considered the illicit supply chain to the dark network.  They are 
typically developed to carry out functions such as the manufacture of weapons, 
supply, escape and evasion, propaganda, and printing of newspapers (Figure 
14).  The nature of serial workflow requires strict adherence to clandestine and 
covert behavior throughout the supply chain to avoid illumination and interdiction 
by opposition security elements.  To ensure redundancy and resilience, branch 
leaders may establish multiple serial workflow chains in parallel depending on the 
environment. 
                                            
100 After Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, "Underground Organization within Insurgency." 
101 See Stephen P. Borgatti and Xun Li, "On Social Network Analysis in a Supply Chain 
Context," Journal of Supply Chain Management 45, no. 2 (2009): 5-22 and Daft, Essentials of 
Organization Theory and Design. 
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Figure 14.   Auxiliary Cells in Series Visualized in Palantir.102 
D. SHORTFALLS IN THE LITERATURE 
There is a negligible body of work on the concept of dark network design.  
We found the works of Marc Sageman and Derek Jones to be the most relevant 
current bodies of work that provide a conceptual framework for designing dark 
networks.  
In Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman highlights the role that social 
networks play to build operational capacity for the global Salafi jihad.103  The 
Salafists rely on their robust networks of trust-based relationships that provide a 
level embeddedness throughout the Muslim world.  This embeddedness in 
diaspora communities provides a base of ideological and material support for the 
jihad.  To avoid illumination and interdiction, Salafists adopt clandestine and 
covert behavior and leverage technology, such as mobile phones and the 
internet, to coordinate work in a decentralize manner through impersonal 
communication.  While Sageman’s work lends insight on how the dark networks 
                                            
102 After Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, "Underground Organization within Insurgency." 
103 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. 
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of the global Salafi jihad coordinate work in a hostile environment, he does not 
provide a design framework for why the networks adopt a particular configuration 
or implement certain security measures. 
From a dark network design standpoint, the most applicable body of work 
we find comes from United States Army Special Forces Major Derek Jones, in 
his monograph: Understanding the Form, Function and Logic of Clandestine 
Cellular Networks. 104  In this work, Jones presents that the long-term survival of 
clandestine cellular networks and organizations relies on the principles of 
clandestine cellular networks.  His first principle is compartmentalization.  By 
reducing the number of people who have operational knowledge, the 
organization creates a virtual wall against counterinsurgent forces.  Second, 
resilience allows the networks to survive counter-network operations and 
reconnect the network around nodes that have been eliminated.  Third, the use 
of proper tradecraft allows for a low-signature, which minimizes the profile of 
organizational communications, movement, internetwork interaction and 
operations.  The fourth principle is purposeful growth; the clandestine recruiting 
of personnel based on the purpose of the network.  Fifth, operational risk 
addresses the paradox of the need of the network to conduct operations to 
maintain and build relevance versus the risk to long-term survival of the network 
posed by those same actions.  The final principle is the idea of organizational 
learning: The fundamental need of a network or organization to learn and adapt 
to changing environmental and situational conditions. These concepts 
demonstrate the inherent complexity of networks.105 
In the literature we have reviewed, a multitude of literature states that dark 
networks come in a variety of forms and shapes and that they must be flexible in 
                                            
104 Derek Jones, Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Cellular 
Networks, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009). 
105 Note: the authors acknowledge that Jones’ study is mainly focused on clandestine 
cellular networks that are one form of a dark network as defined by our study.  Jones’ design 
concepts of clandestine cellular networks can be reasonably applied to the dark network design 
challenges discussed in theory here. 
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order to effectively react to the changes in their environment, yet we found no 
discussion of alternative designs for dark networks.106  Furthermore, we have not 
found any literature on what drives networks, especially dark ones, to adopt a 
particular configuration or basic structure.  Although Jones provides principles for 
clandestine networks to follow in order to survive, neither he, nor anyone else 
provides a framework a for dark network design to ensure adherence to his 
principles of clandestine networks.   
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed current bodies of knowledge pertaining to 
organization design and network research and found that dark networks share 
similar characteristics as light/bright networks, but have additional design 
challenges related to network relationships and structure that they must address 
to operate in a hostile environment.  In the face of hostility, dark networks must 
buffer environmental hostility and coordinate work in a secure manner to produce 
output.  Failure to design themselves to overcome those challenges may not only 
prohibit the network to achieve its goals, but sets the condition for catastrophic 
collapse of the network with fatal consequences. 
Legality determines hostility that subsequently drives the need for 
clandestine and covert behavior.  This behavior requires strict adherence to 
principals and techniques designed to conduct illegal activity in a secure manner 
in order to prevent illumination and interdiction of the dark network.  Dark 
networks must configure themselves based on a “fail-safe” principle that controls 
the coordination of work in a secure manner through the deliberate manipulation 
of the nature of the networks relationships and structure to prevent compromise 
while operationalizing their purpose.  Dark network design determines the 
optimum configuration for the task environment.  In the next chapter, we will 
present our theory of dark network design in detail. 
                                            
106 Milward and Raab, "Dark Networks as Problems Revisited," 7, and Jones, “Form, 
Function, and Logic of Clandestine Networks.” 
 53
III. THEORY OF DARK NETWORK DESIGN  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II reviewed current literature on organizations and networks.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to present out theory of dark network design. Current 
theories on dark networks do not address what determines their configuration in 
an effort to operationalize their network purpose.  We submit that dark networks 
have natural configurations and that these configurations differ according to the 
network’s purpose and design state.  Although no two networks are exactly the 
same, we submit dark networks have similar basic components that are 
configured to produce output through coordinated work to achieve a purpose.  
First, we will review our two dimensions of dark network design: relative hostility 
of the environment and the requirement for the secure coordination of work.  
Next, we describe the four typological configurations of dark networks: 
Opportunistic-Mechanical, Selective-Technical, Restrictive-Organic, and 
Surgical-Ad Hoc.  We identify and define the three fundamental components of 
dark networks: directional- responsible for developing and framing the network’s 
purpose; operational- responsible for conducting decisive action to achieve the 
purpose; and supportive- responsible for enabling decisive action to achieve the 
purpose.  To produce output, dark networks must overcome two critical design 
challenges and configure their components to buffer hostility and coordinate 
work.  They do this by adhering to what we identify as the principles of dark 
network design: security, agility, resilience, direction setting, control, and 
capacity.  Finally, we introduce our dark network system model that illustrates 
how a dark network coordinates work in a hostile environment to produce output 
and achieve its purpose. 
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B. DIMENSIONS OF DARK NETWORK DESIGN 
1. External Dimension: Hostility of the Environment 
Hostility in the environment is the relationship between the dark network 
and its environment where opposition entities (state or non-state actors) have the 
will and capacity to counter the intended purpose of the dark network using lethal 
and non-lethal means.   
2. Internal Dimension: Secure Coordination of Work 
The requirement for secure coordination of work is the dark network’s 
need and desire to commit resources to purposely create an efficient state of 
coordination of work in order to achieve objectives and prevent destruction.   
C. DARK NETWORK TYPOLOGY 
The two design dimensions, the hostility of the environmental hostility and 
the network’s requirement for secure coordination of work, yield four pure-form 
design states four typological dark network configurations (Figure 15).  We refer 
to these as design states and typological configurations as: Type-I:  
Opportunistic-Mechanical; Type-II: Restrictive-Organic:; Type-III; Selective-




Figure 15.   Dark Network Typology 
1. Type I: Opportunistic-Mechanical 
This type of dark network operates in an environment with a moderate 
level of hostility and has a moderate requirement for a secure coordination of 
work.  Activity is opportunistic in nature and the network employs mechanistic 
governance.  Organized criminal networks and paramilitary forces that operate in 
a selectively-overt (not covert) status are representative to this type of dark 
network.  These networks are aware that the state can (and will) only use a 
limited application of force to inhibit their efforts.  Examples include the Russian 
Solntsevskaya Brotherhood, Los Zetas in Mexico, and the transnational gang 
Mara Salvatrucha-13. 
2. Type II: Restrictive-Organic 
This type of network operates in environments a high level of  hostility, but 
has a moderate requirement for a secure coordination of work.  Activity is 
restrictive in nature because of the increased environmental hostility and is 
organic in nature to balance security and operational capacity.  This type of 
network is one that is in a conflict with hostile opposition elements, but may have 
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a high level of support from the community that gives it a more liberal freedom of 
movement in its environment.  Type-II networks will typically maintain a 
clandestine and covert lifestyle, emerge conduct and overt act, and then return to 
the underground when threatened.  Examples include Indonesia’s Jemmah 
Islamiyah (JI), the Haqqani network in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the South 
Florida-based anti-Castro movement Alpha 66, and the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA). 
3. Type III: Selective-Technical 
This type of network operates in moderately hostile environments but have 
a high requirement for secure coordination of work.  Activity is selective in nature 
because of the moderate environmental hostility and is generally requires 
specialized education or technical knowledge.  These networks typically 
resemble a supply chain network with serial workflow.  This type of network may 
be involved in smuggling, financing, and other supportive activities and generally 
operates from a sanctuary that provides freedom of movement and action in 
areas of higher hostility.  Historical examples of this type of network include the 
French Resistance Allied pilot evacuation network during World War II and the 
global network of Hezbollah. 
4. Type IV: Surgical-Ad Hoc 
This type of network operates in an environment with a high level of 
hostility and has a high requirement for secure coordination of work.  Activity is 
surgical in nature because of the high environmental hostility and the cells are 
generally multifunctional and ad hoc due to its strict adherence to clandestine 
and covert behavior.  Small, highly compartmented cells and singletons operating 
in an area where they are constantly being hunted typify a surgical-ad hoc 
network.  Historical examples of this type of dark network are the Israeli Mossad 
covert action network designed to assassinate the Black September terrorists 
and Mohammed Atta’s Hamburg network responsible for conducting the 911 
attacks. 
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D. DARK NETWORK COMPONENTS 
 
Figure 16.   Dark Network Components 
1. Directional Component 
The directional component is responsible for developing and framing the 
network’s purpose, what it is going to accomplish, how it is going to accomplish 
it, and ensures that all activities of the networks are nested in its purpose.  They 
create the network’s guiding narrative and direct its implementation.  The 
directional component consists of the core directors and the peripheral directors. 
a. Core Directors 
The core directors set the strategic pace and ideology for the 
network.  It is often removed from day to day operations, but will be considered 
the “face” of the network.  The core directors develop and frame the network’s 
purpose and doctrinal ideology that provides strategic direction that serves as the 
overarching guidance to the entire network.  For example, the Tabilan’s Quetta 
Shura, headed by Mullah Omar, serves as the core director for the Taliban 
network in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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b. Peripheral Directors 
The peripheral directors provide direction and coordinate the work 
of the operational component and supportive component to produce value based 
on the network’s purpose.  In the Mintzberg sense, peripheral directors are the 
network’s middle management, or middle line.  It ensures the day-to-day 
operational and supportive activities nest with the network’s strategic direction.  
The peripheral directors operationalize and direct the execution of operational 
and support activities based on strategic intent through specified and implied 
directives based on the network’s purpose.  The Taliban’s core directors consist 
of the key players at the operational and tactical levels that direct the activities of 
the rank and file members of the operational and supportive components. 
2.  Operational Component 
The operational component is responsible for conducting decisive action 
(work) to produce effects (value) that achieves the network’s purpose.  Decisive 
Action elements are the entities that achieve defined objectives required to 
achieve the networks objectives related to its purpose.  Peripheral directors from 
the directional component are embedded in the operational component and 
assume its leadership roles and functions.  Decisive action is accomplished 
through lethal and non-lethal action.   
a. Lethal Action 
Lethal action entities achieve their objectives through the decisive 
use, or implied use of violence using direct and indirect fire weapons that cause 
destructive or lethal results.  These entities may be referred to as direct action 
elements.  Lethal actions are operations or activities (work) that are typically 
offensive in nature (i.e. ambushes, raids, bombing, assassination, direct and 
indirect fires, etc.) to cause destructive effects (value) to achieve the network’s 
purpose.  Peripheral directors from the directional component are embedded in 
the operational component and assume its leadership roles and functions.  
Taliban elements that conduct attacks on the Afghan security forces and coalition 
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partners through direct fire, indirect fire, or improvised explosives devices 
represent operational components that conduct lethal action. 
b. Non-Lethal Action 
Non-lethal action entities achieve their objectives through the 
decisive use of non-lethal means to execute decisive operations.  Non-lethal 
actions are operations or activities (work) that are typically offensive in nature 
(i.e. cyber-attack, information operations, subversion, electronic warfare, 
intelligence operatives, etc.) to cause destructive effects (value) to achieve the 
network’s purpose.  Taliban information operation elements that rapidly craft and 
disseminate media messages designed to erode the legitimacy and degrade the 
operational capacity of the coalition security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
are representative of non-lethal decisive action elements. 
3. Supportive Component 
The supportive component is responsible for establishing mechanisms 
and conducting activities (work) to provide resources (value) that enable the 
operational component to conduct decisive action (work) and produce effects 
(value) to achieve the network’s purpose.  The supportive component consists of 
active and passive supporters. 
a. Active Support 
Active support is full-time or part-time activity (work) by actors that 
are witting of the true nature of their actions (i.e. trainers, safe site keepers, 
financiers, transportation agents, couriers, recruiters, surveillance and early 
warning, supply, administrative activities, etc.) to provide resources (values) 
necessary to resource and enable decisive operations and the network as a 
whole to achieve the network’s purpose.  Direct support entities work in concert 
with decisive action elements and the peripheral directors to give them the 
materials they need to conduct violent or spectacular events.  Indirect support 
elements often work on the periphery of the network structure and are in general 
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support to the entire network.  These indirect support entities typically operate in 
the domain of the gray networks to interface with sources of passive support.  
The elaborate network of witting safe house keepers, cache emplacers, 
intelligence agents, transportation agents, recruiters, and the supply chains that 
provides all forms of lethal and non-lethal materials exemplifies types of active 
supporters. 
b. Passive Support 
Passive support is witting inaction or unwitting action (work) that 
enables and/or provides freedom of movement or action (value) for the 
directional, operational, or supportive components to achieve the network’s 
purpose.  Passive supporters are generally those who are sympathetic to the 
network’s purpose, but will not or cannot take an active role.  Passive support 
can be financial support through putting money in jar at a local bar or simply 
refusing to give support to opposition forces of the dark network.  Dark networks 
will use criteria-based networks to find sources of passive support.  This shared 
set of attributes forms a basis of strong ties that recruiters can use to turn 
passive supporters to active members of the dark networks through persuasion 
or coercion.  Passive support is the population where the dark network finds its 
sanctuary from hostile opposition forces.  Afghans that do not outwardly reject 
the Taliban, or provide information to coalition security forces in order to 
illuminate and interdict the insurgent network, are passive supporters of the 
Taliban.  This support may be provided willingly, or gain through coercion. 
Based on our understanding of the directional, operational, and 
supportive components of a dark network, we are ready to examine how they 
work together to achieve a purpose.  Next, we will present our dark network 
system model to illustrate how a network defines a purpose, conducts work, and 
produces values in a hostile environment. 
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E. CHALLENGES AND PRINCIPLES OF DARK NETWORK DESIGN 
Dark networks must overcome inherent design challenges to 
conduct secure coordination of work there is an elevated level of hostility in the 
environment.  We postulate that the two fundamental dark network design 
challenges are buffering external hostility and coordinating work to produce 
output.  To overcome their design challenges, dark networks must design 
themselves to adhere to the principles of dark network design: security, 
resilience, agility, direction setting, control, and capacity.  Failure to adhere to 
these six principals could have fatal consequences. 
1. Buffering External Hostility 
The first design challenge, buffering external hostility, relates insulating 
the network from the detrimental effects of the environment and reducing 
hostility.  Three principles of dark network design that enable buffering are: 
security, agility, and resilience. 
• Principle 1: Security 
Security encompasses the application technical and non-technical 
means and methods of clandestine and covert behavior in order to 
prevent illumination and interdiction of the network.   
• Principle 2: Agility 
Agility entails the network’s ability to adapt rapidly to changes in the 
environment.   
• Principle 3: Resilience 
Resilience is the network’s ability to react to adversity, such as 
interdiction by opposition elements, and return to its prior state 
without catastrophic network disintegration or significant reduction 
in operational capacity.  Compartmentalization, redundancy, and 
decentralization contribute to the resilience of a dark network.  
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2. Coordinating Work to Produce Output    
The second design challenge, coordinating work to produce output, is 
related to the development of mechanisms the enable decisive action that is 
necessary to achieve the network’s purpose.  Three principals of dark network 
design that are critical for coordinating work to produce output are direction 
setting, control, and capacity. 
• Principle 4: Direction Setting 
Direction setting provides the overarching purpose for all network 
activities. The direction keeps members of the network engaged in 
their activities and focuses them on the collective goal that 
transcends the needs and desires of the individual actors.  The 
strategic core and functional periphery of the directional component 
set the network’s direction to achieve an intangible ideological 
purpose through decisive action that results in tangible output. 
• Principle 5: Control 
Control is the coordination and synchronization of work that keeps 
the network focused on achieving its purpose through assignment 
of roles and responsibilities, evaluation of processes, and 
regulation of the network’s resources on a continuous basis.  While 
dark networks tend to have loose measures of control, they still 
require mechanisms to manage the network’s resources and 
produce output in a secure manner that does not lead to network 
illumination and interdiction. 
• Principle 6: Capacity 
Capacity is the development of the necessary human, physical, and 
virtual infrastructure to coordinate work between the directional, 
operational, and supportive components that enables decisive 
action and achieves the network’s purpose. 
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F. DARK NETWORK SYSTEM MODEL 
The dark network system model (Figure 17) provides an illustration of how 
the directional, operational, and supportive components of a dark network 
interact to produce output through secure coordination of work that is directed to 
a common purpose.  Adhering to the principals of dark network design enables 
the network to produce output while buffering environmental hostility.  The dark 
network system model summarizes the theory of dark network design. 
 
Figure 17.   Dark Network System Model 
G. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we presented out theory of dark network design.  First, we 
showed how the level of hostility in the environment and the network’s 
requirement for the secure coordination of work determine its design state.  Next, 
presented four design states and typological configurations of dark networks: 
Type-I: Opportunistic-Mechanical; Type-II: Restrictive-Organic; Type-III; 
Selective-Technical; and Type-IV: Surgical-Ad Hoc.  Within each design state, 
dark networks configure themselves by arranging three fundamental 
components: directional, operational, and supportive.  Dark networks must 
configure themselves to overcome design challenges to buffer hostility and 
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coordinate work to produce output.  They do this by adhering to what we identify 
as the principles of dark network design: security, agility, resilience, direction 
setting, control, and capacity.  Finally, we presented our dark network system 
model that illustrates how a dark network coordinates work in a hostile 
environment to produce output and achieve its purpose. 
Looking ahead to chapters IV-VII, we apply our theory of dark network 
design to examine four dark networks based on our four design states.  We 
selected our illustrative examples based on three criteria: the transnational 
nature of the network, the closeness of fit to the typological design state, and the 
availability of open source information on the network.  Chapter IV examines the 
transnational gang Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13) to illustrate a Type-I 
Opportunistic-Mechanical network.  Chapter V examines the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) to illustrate a Type-II Restrictive-Organic network.  
Chapter VI examines Hezbollah in Latin America to illustrate a Type-III Selective-
Technical network.  Finally, Chapter VII examines the Hamburg Network that was 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks to illustrate a Type-IV Surgical-Ad hoc network.  
Our theory of dark network design will be used to analyze these examples and 
determine the network’s configuration based on its design state and discover any 




IV. TYPE-I DARK NETWORK: OPPORTUNISTIC-MECHANICAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 18.   Type-I Dark Network Quadrant 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate an example of a dark network 
whose design state is defined by moderate environmental hostility and a 
moderate requirement for secure coordination of work that yields what we call 
Type-I Opportunistic-Mechanical configuration.  Based on our theory of dark 
network design, the example shows how an Opportunistic-Mechanical dark 
network is configured to achieve its purpose and how it is vulnerable to 
illumination and interdiction. 
Type-I dark networks can include organized crime, gangs, mass radical 
movements, drug trafficking organizations, and paramilitary elements.  For 
example, Russian Organized crime groups, such as   (or the 
Solntsevskaya Brotherhood), conduct a variety of illicit activities that include 
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money laundering, prostitution, human trafficking and arms dealing.107  This 
group operates through dozens of small cells at home and abroad.108  Los Zetas, 
a Mexican drug cartel tied to a wide range of criminal activities, such as human 
trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, operates in a cell-like networked structure to 
limit information and remain agile in their environment.109  One report states they 
are well armed and operate at a higher tactical level than local authorities, which 
gives them freedom of movement.110   
For our illustration of a Type-I dark network configuration, we use the 
transnational gang Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13).  Although MS-13 has degrees 
of variation within the network, we selected it over the others because of its 
transnational nature; it most closely illustrates the typological design state of a 
Type-I dark network; and its prominence provides a rich collection of open-
source information on the dark network.    
B. OVERVIEW OF MARA SALVATRUCHA-13 
The transnational nature and expanding influence of MS-13 presents an 
increasing threat to U.S. national security and stability in the Western 
Hemisphere.  In the early 1980s through the 1990s, over 2 million immigrants 
fled from civil wars that ravaged Central America and into the United States of 
America.  Most of the immigrants fled from El Salvador and settled in the Los 
Angeles, California area.  In the Los Angeles area alone, the Salvadoran 
                                            
107 Ramon J. Miro, “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002”, Library of 
Congress Report (February 2003), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf 
(accessed on November 29, 2010), 29. 
108 Ibid., 29.  Also see Gretchen Peters, “Drug Trafficking in the Pacific Has a Distinct 
Russian Flavor,” San Francisco Chronicle, 30 May 2001, http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-05-
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109 United States Congress, Weak Bilateral Law Enforcement Presence at the U.S.-Mexico 
Border:  Territorial Integrity and Safety Issues for American Citizens, Joint Hearing of the 109th 
Congress, 1st Session, November 17, 2005, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2006), 6–7; Michael Ware, “Los Zetas called Mexico’s most dangerous drug cartel,” 
CNN.com/world, http://www.cnn.com/209/WORLD/americas/08/06/mexico.drug.cartels/index.html 
(accessed on November 29, 2010). 
110 United States Congress, Weak Bilateral Law Enforcement, 6–7. 
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population grew from 30,000 to 300,000; a vast majority of them, due to not 
being granted refugee or asylum status, were illegal aliens.111  MS-13 reportedly 
originated in Los Angeles in the 1980s as a result of victimization of Salvadoran 
immigrants by local Hispanic gangs.  The large number of Salvadoran 
immigrants banded together and formed the MS-13 gang as a means of 
protection.112  Over time, the gang grew and evolved from a means of protecting 
the Salvadoran immigrants to participation in a variety of activities ranging from 
extortion to drug trafficking.113   
As law enforcement cracked down and began deporting MS-13 members, 
the gang used the deportation to their advantage.  First, the deportees set up 
MS-13 cells in their native country of El Salvador and expanded into Honduras 
and Guatemala.  Second, the deported members found that Central America was 
a prime recruiting ground and began recruiting new members.  These new 
recruits flooded into the United States to flee the law in their home country and 
others joined their families on the “immigrant trail,” which led to the establishment 
of cliques (geographically defined subgroups) throughout the United States.114  
Currently, MS-13 has active operations in 42 states and the District of Columbia 




                                            
111 Jessica M. Vaughan and Jon D. Feere, “Taking Back the Streets:  ICE and Local Law 
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Honduras, and Guatemala.115  Other reports show activity in 48 states, 
Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico—the only states showing no activity are 
South Dakota and Vermont.116 
According to a report from the Congressional Research Service, street 
gangs are characterized as a first-generation, a second-generation, or a third-
generation gang.117  A first-generation gang is a traditional, turf-oriented and 
localized street gang.  It is relatively unsophisticated, engages in criminal 
activities and tends towards a loose leadership structure.  A second-generation 
gang is more organized and tends to “assume a market rather than a turf 
orientation.”118  While most urban gangs fit the description of a first or second-
generation gang, there is evidence that MS-13 has some characteristics of a 
third-generation gang.  A third-generation gang is characterized as a “highly 
sophisticated” and “mercenary-type group[s] with goals of power or financial 
acquisition and a set of fully evolved political aims.”119  Although MS-13 does not 
appear to have fully developed into a third-generation gang nor does it have 
known links to terrorist groups, some researchers assert that these types of 
gangs and terrorist groups share similar characteristics, such as “a propensity for 
indiscriminate violence, intimidation [and] coercion [that] transcend[s] borders, 
and target[s] nation-states.”120  Currently, MS-13 is a first-generation gang with 
elements of—and possibly evolving into—a third-generation gang.  It 
characterized by the “opportunistic criminal activity and inter-gang rivalry”121 of 
first-generation gangs and its cells also employ tactics characteristic of third-
generation gangs. 
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C. TYPE-I DESIGN STATE 
1. Moderate Hostility of the Environment 
The Type-I design state’s level of hostility in the environment can vary.  
The groups in this design state are already at a medium level of hostility due to 
their intent to commit illicit activities.  Moderate hostility of the environment 
results when the opposition elements lack the will and/or capacity to counter the 
dark network.  The dark network and opposition elements then reach equilibrium 
where the opposition accepts a certain level of illegal activity by the dark network 
before committing or acquiring additional assets for interdiction.  Beyond MS-13, 
another example of this type of network may be a radicalized faction of a legal 
light/bright network that conducts illegal activity in support of a similar purpose.  
For example, protesting abortion is not illegal, but Pro-Life activists who bomb 
clinics or perform crimes against medical practitioners who either perform or 
support the performance of abortion are performing illegal acts.  These 
individuals and groups tend not to hide their affiliation and in some cases are 
protected by their constitutional rights as long as they do not commit acts of 
violence.  Once they conduct illegal activity, hostility becomes high for individual 
actors and the network as a whole.   
This variance in environmental hostility is evident in our MS-13 example.  
Environmental hostility varies from clique to clique within the United States, 
mostly dependent upon level and frequency of crime and capability and/or priority 
level of local law enforcement.  The hostility also varies transnationally.  In El 
Salvador, local officials have adopted a hard-hitting approach called Mano Dura 
to combat the gang and are beginning to make it more difficult for MS-13 to carry 
out its operations.  For this reason, MS-13 in El Salvador appears to be 
transitioning to a more hierarchical structure and adopting more secure 
measures to coordinate its activities.122 
                                            
122 Clare Ribando, “Gangs in Central America,” CRS Report for Congress (May 10, 2005), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22141.pdf (accessed on November 29, 2010), 3–4. Also see 
Vaughan and Feere, “Taking Back the Streets.”  
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2.  Moderate Requirement for Secure Coordination of Work 
The moderate hostility in the environment also lends itself towards the 
moderate requirement for secure coordination of work to achieve the network’s 
purpose.  A Type-I configuration does not rely on a high degree of 
compartmentalization or clandestine communication to accomplish its tasks 
because it does not have to.  The environment that a Type-I dark network 
operates, while not necessarily friendly, affords freedom of movement because 
the legitimate government may have neither the will, nor the capacity, to 
effectively combat dark network.  Reduced security requirements make 
coordination of work less restrictive and more collaborative.  The individuals and 
networks in this quadrant are can have meetings in the open, advertise their 
affiliations, and do not need to conceal their true identities.123  Details of specific 
operations may be guarded, but their goals are not.  In the case of MS-13, the 
gang does not conceal its goal of being the most violent gang in the world.  It will 
use some measure of protection to prevent compromise of gang operations, such 
as using code words and/or utilizing the MS-13 alphabet in correspondence, but 
they do not hide the fact that they are drug traffickers, murderers, or kidnappers. 
D. TYPE-I DARK NETWORK: OPPORTUNISTIC-MECHANICAL  
We characterize Type-I dark networks as opportunistic and mechanical for 
the following reasons: 
1. Opportunistic Action 
The opportunistic nature of this dark network indicates a desire to make 
money, obtain and hold power, and follow the model of “any crime, any time” as 
long as it is profitable.  Opportunistic action means to be involved in “a variety of 
criminal enterprises and is willing to commit almost any crime for monetary 
                                            
123 Gang members tend to adopt street names (pseudonyms) that become or their nom de 
guerre.  Over time, gang members may only be known by their street name and create a de facto 
“cover” that makes illumination of the dark network problematic. 
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compensation.”124  For example, MS-13 is implicated in a myriad of illicit activity, 
such as extortion, rape, drug trafficking, human trafficking, murder, theft, assault, 
prostitution throughout the United States and Central America.125 
2. Mechanical Configuration 
In a Mintzberg-sense, a mechanistic network resembles the diversified 
configuration—also known as a divisional or matrix form of organizational 
structure—that is selectively decentralized at the network level, centralized and 
authoritarian at the clique/cell level, and relies on the standardization of outputs 
to coordinate work and achieve the network’s purpose.126  Networks in this 
quadrant primarily operate in a decentralized manner, but recognize a system of 
relative power and authority and adhere to a strict set of norms promulgated by 
the strategic core of the directional component.127  This recognized informal 
influence structure provides a framework for formal authority should the dark 
network decide to adopt a hierarchal form of organization as the situation 
permits.128 
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Although networks by definition do not have a formal hierarchy, 
governance does exist in varying degrees throughout the network by means of 
an informal power structure recognized by members of the network.  This 
informal architecture of power and authority is based on respect and is guided by 
strict set of rules and norms.129.  This mechanical network does not have a single 
leader, but a virtual “big man” or directional nodes may emerge at various points 
in the network.130  While cells within this network may have little to no 
communication with one another, each cell tends have central actors who are 
responsible for not only representing the interest of their respective cell or clique, 
but also maintaining the established norms of the network and achieving its 
purpose.  In some cases, there may be more discernable structures or roles that 
exert greater influence based on an actor’s centrality, power, or prestige in the 
network.131  Reflecting on The Advent of Netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s term 
“panarchy” best describes the aforementioned pseudo-hierarchy and how 
networks are able to selectively decentralize and standardize outputs through a 
strong purpose and set of established norms:132  
Performance over time may depend on a powerful doctrine or 
ideology, or at least a strong set of common interests and 
objectives, that spans all nodes, and to which the members 
subscribe in a deep way.  Such a doctrine can enable them to be 
“all of one mind” even if they are dispersed and devoted to different 
tasks.  It can provide an ideational, strategic, and operational 
centrality that allows for tactical decentralization.  It can set 
boundaries and provide guidelines for decisions and actions so that  
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they do not have to resort to a hierarchy—‘they know what they 
have to do.’  That is why a nouveau term like panarchy may be 
more accurate than heterarchy.  
When cliques within the network do not “do what they know they have to 
do,” the directional elements of the network may exercise centralized authority on 
a selective basis in order to maintain the standards of the network.  Once the 
crisis is resolved, the network will return to the selectively decentralized status 
quo.  At the clique level, governance tends to be highly mechanical and 
authoritarian in nature based on the network’s purpose and ideology.  This loose 
construct of semi-autonomous cliques (cells) that are unified by a common 
purpose and an established set of norms enable the network to selectively 
decentralize for greater security.  This arrangement provides a fail-safe that 
ensures the compromise of one cell will not impact the network as a whole.  
Likewise, the removal of a particular network cell leader does little to topple the 
entire network.  Instead, it will allow for others to rise and assume control within 
the cell.   
E. FUNDAMENTAL COMPONENTS 
 
Figure 19.   Illustration of Dark Network Components 
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1. Directional Component  
MS-13 began as a local street gang, formed for protection, in the Hispanic 
barrios of Los Angeles and was not originally associated as a criminal 
organization.  It existed to protect the safety of its members and members “held 
in high regard” served as the gang’s decision makers.  MS-13’s purpose has 
evolved over time.  The motto of Mara Salvatrucha is “Mata, Viola, Controla,” or 
“Kill, Rape, Control.”  Despite originally forming to protect El Salvadoran 
immigrants in the Los Angeles area from Mexican gangs, Mara Salvatrucha now 
strives to become and remain the most violent and most feared gang in the 
world.133  Their crimes may vary from clique to clique, depending on location and 
direction from local gang leaders, but the overall purpose is to be violent and 
make money.  Members of MS-13 have been convicted of crimes ranging from 
murder for hire to extortion to prostitution and rape.  One account in the Northern 
Virginia area describes an extortion ring where the gang members tax the 
parents of young girls for “protection money” to ensure the young girls are not 
raped.  While operating in loose-autonomous cells with little to no visible 
hierarchy, this continuity of purpose is maintained through the common desire to 
be the most feared gang.  This attitude is fueled by media reports, 
documentaries, and the increase of Congressional Hearings on gang violence, 
where MS-13 is the headline gang of record.134 
The network’s configuration of loose, autonomous cells makes it resilient.  
Taking out a “leader” just activates a promotion system for emergent leaders.  
While there may be a lull in operations, the gang is not stopped and authority 
remains intact while the gang member serves his/her jail time. Interdiction does 
not result in catastrophic network disruption and deportation does not work.  In 
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one case, a MS-13 member was arrested in Suffolk County, Virginia, and New 
York on drug charges, was deported, and immediately returned to the United 
States and was subsequently arrested in Yuma, Arizona.135  Similarly, another 
MS-13 member arrested in Santa Cruz, California in June 2010 had been 
deported three times in the previous eight years.136  Further, deportation of 
undocumented MS-13 gang members has resulted in a networked, criminal 
diaspora throughout the Americas.137  Arresting members of the directional 
component does not remove them from the network on a permanent basis. 
MS-13 is organized into geographically defined subgroups, or “cliques”, 
operating as loose, autonomous cells with the largest active concentrations in 
Los Angeles, CA, Washington D.C./Northern Virginia and New York City.  It is 
widely believed that Los Angeles gang members have an elevated status among 
their MS-13 counterparts across the country.138  In each setting, the gang’s 
directional component morphs to fit the environment.  While machete attacks 
might occur on the East Coast, they are rare on the West Coast.  While car thefts 
and drug trafficking might be big in North Carolina, gang-on-gang violence 
predominates in Virginia. The decentralized nature of MS-13—with no clear 
hierarchy or structure at the network level—makes interdicting the gang as a 
transnational entity particularly challenging for law enforcement authorities.  Law 
enforcement officials admit, "Taking out the heart of the leadership is very hard if 
there is no definitive leadership."139  Unlike the hierarchal and formal structure of 
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MS-13 in El Salvador, there is no clear indication of a formal command structure 
within the U.S. at the network level.140  Despite this, there is evidence that 
smaller, junior cliques take cues from larger, more senior cliques—namely Los 
Angeles—and “whenever a more senior clique declares another gang as an 
enemy, all junior cliques follow suit and make the same declaration.”141  Some 
law enforcement agencies report increasing indications of contact and 
synchronization among the larger MS-13 chapters in Los Angeles, Washington 
D.C, Northern Virginia, New York City.  This could be signaling an attempt to 
build a “national command structure” due to the expanding size of the gang and 
increased need for centralized control142   
At the clique level, the close geographic distribution of its members and 
permits a centralized, almost totalitarian form of governance.  For example, 
cliques in Los Angeles have established an internal organizational structure with 
assigned functional roles and responsibilities.  The U.S. Department of Justice 
states, “Several Los Angeles cliques have adopted a military-type organizational 
structure, appointing captains, lieutenants, and soldiers.”143  These larger 
chapters currently form the strategic leadership of MS-13, providing the overall 
purpose and direction of the gang.  While there is no clear indication of direct 
control over the cliques, there is evidence of an “approval process in some kind 
of hierarchy beyond the clique” including cases where MS-13 leaders have sent 
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“emissaries” to give direction to underperforming or “quieter” cliques.144  John P. 
Sullivan and Samuel Logan best describe the MS-13 panarchy through what they 
call the “hierarchy of respect”:145 
In operational terms, the “hierarchy of respect” is expressed 
through a web of social relationships within individual cliques and 
social/business relationships between cliques. At the clique level, 
leadership is distributed. There are two primary leaders, the “first 
word” (primera palabra) and the “second word” (segunda palabra) 
who operate something like a commander and an executive officer 
in military settings. The segunda palabra from large, powerful 
cliques often exerts influence over smaller or subordinate cliques. 
In many facets, this leadership is neo-feudal, where leadership is 
determined by fealty to a leader who collects taxes and the support 
of warriors and in turn offers protection. 
The loose-autonomous nature of the cells within the United States differs 
from the cliques in Central America.  In El Salvador, the cliques are well 
organized and follow a formal command hierarchy.146  We posit that this variation 
in organizational configuration between the U.S., that adopts a networked form of 
organization, and foreign elements of MS-13, that adopts a more formal form of 
organization, is a result of differing conditions of the external environment and 
the age of the cliques.  
2. Operational Component 
Within its operational component, MS-13 utilizes brutal violence (lethal 
decisive action), intimidation, and coercion (non-lethal decisive action) on rival 
gangs, the population, police, government officials, and on its own members.  As 
previously mentioned in the Directional Component section, each separate clique 
conducts the operations they feel fit their environment in order to make money 
and exert influence and control.  If the environment allows for drug running and 
prostitution rings in Chicago, then that clique will exploit that opportunity.  As the 
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environment begins to turn more hostile, law enforcement cracking down on the 
drug trade for example, then the clique may move its area of operations or 
transition to another activity.  The same holds true for adjusting the use of lethal 
and non-lethal decisive action.  An MS-13 clique in Maryland was instructed by 
another, more established, local clique to do more killing by increasing their 
“output” to kill two rival gang members every 15 days.  Realizing this would result 
in a crackdown by local police, the increase was overruled and the clique opted 
instead to increase its coercion and intimidation tactics.147 
MS-13 is agile and is not as concerned with security in the sense that it 
does not hide its existence from law enforcement.  In most regions, Law 
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) are unable to respond effectively to the violence of 
the MS-13 cliques.  MS-13 prefers quantity (killing rival gang members, 
controlling local drug industry or prostitution ring, etc) to security.  Being arrested 
and either jailed or deported does not affect their “productivity.”  In regions where 
more security measures are required due to an increase in law enforcement 
capabilities, MS-13 has responded by using members who do not have visible 
tattoos and moving meetings to less obvious locations.  In one area, the gang 
formed a soccer team so that they had a reason to meet in the open.  They also 
employ very basic security measures to protect day-to-day operations and 
knowledge from outsiders.  For example, MS-13 has its own slang as well as its 
own alphabet.148  This security is not only performed outside the gang, it is also 
verified inside.  It is not unheard of for a “credit check”, which is a background to 
ascertain someone’s standing within the MS-13 gang, to verify security within. 
Depending on current environment, the gang adapts its level of violence or 
crime of choice.  In some cases, operations are moved all together (but not 
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stopped):  “some attribute the rise in gang activity in Maryland to the success of 
the Regional Gang Task Force here in Virginia…instead of reducing gang 
activity, we are just spreading it around.”149  Agility of MS-13 is also enabled by a 
variety of other circumstances:150  
The fluidity of our borders, insufficient immigration enforcement 
tools, a lack of social programs that promote youth development, 
the persistence of poverty, and a limited regional approach to law 
enforcement create the perfect storm for violent gangs to thrive. 
As previously stated, MS-13 exerts control on both the population and the 
gang itself.  Enforcement is brutal.  We need to look no further than the gang’s 
motto to know their methods of control include coercion and intimidation.  
Coercion and intimidation is used on both the population and the gang members 
themselves.   
3. Supportive Component 
Law enforcement agencies incorrectly assume that Mara Salvatrucha’s 
lack of a clear, formal hierarchy and its utilization of decentralized control 
equates to a lack of capacity.  The network derives its support capacity through 
its members’ desire to be affiliated with the gang and provides a wide base of 
active and passive support for the gang.  Support is generated through coercion 
and intimidation, which is typically tied to the use, or implied use of lethal force.   
Constant recruitment and a surprising level of sophistication of its 
supportive component provide MS-13 the infrastructure that is necessary to 
achieve its purpose.  With an estimated 10,000 “hard-core” members in the U.S. 
alone, officials indicate that MS-13 is the “fastest-growing and most violent street 
gang in the United States.”151  The Center for Immigration Studies states, “Since 
its origin, MS-13 has evolved from a single turf gang into a networked 
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organization comprised of individual ‘cliques’ that interact on the basis of social 
networks, influence, and opportunity”.152  Appealing to both poverty-ridden 
regions and at-risk youth, membership MS-13 offers both a job and a family.  
“The Maras offer a code, a family to members, many of whom come from broken 
homes or the streets.”153  The appeal of MS-13 generates its base of active and 
passive support. 
There are many indications of both active and passive support for MS-13.  
Active support comes from families who were part of the original gang that 
formed in the 1980s, some of them raising their children and grandchildren to 
become MS-13 gang members, and employers who knowingly employ workers 
with known MS-13 ties.154  Most gangsters do not make enough money to live 
the lifestyle full-time.  According to a report from the Center for Immigration 
Studies, a town in Virginia discovered an MS-13 gang member working in an 
elementary school using false documents to obtain employment.  It is assumed 
that many employers, family members and neighbors are “completely unwitting 
about [their] gang involvement” and even complain when arrests occur, 
“Everyone loves the guys during the day [for their labor] but it’s at night when 
they cause me [and the police] all the problems,” claimed one Virginia state 
trooper.155 
A variety of people and institutions are passive support elements for the 
gang—sometimes unwittingly.  A majority if MS-13 gang members (including 
those who are illegal aliens) work legitimate day jobs.  The employers of these 
individuals are unwitting actors in the sustainment of MS-13.  Additionally, the 
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gang also uses the U.S. immigration and deportation processes to their 
advantage.  The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRIRA) enabled Los Angeles law enforcement to crack down on MS-13 
activity.  The result was increased deportations.  In some reports nearly 20,000 
Central American criminals were deported from the United States from 2000 to 
2004.  Once these criminals returned to El Salvador, they discovered “fertile 
ground for recruitment” due to severe poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and 
limited capabilities of local law enforcement.156  The large number of deported 
criminals extradited to El Salvador overwhelmed a government already focused 
on restoring order for thousands of refugees returning after the signing of the 
Chapultapec Accords.157  While not the intention of the IIRIRA or other 
immigration laws, these policies enabled MS-13 to become a transnational gang.  
As these members were deported, either for their illegal immigrant status or for 
committing crimes as noncitizens, they returned to their home countries and 
began recruiting.  This allowed gang to grow in popularity and plant roots 
throughout Central America.  There are reports of MS-13 members being 
intentionally deported to gain intelligence on the new U.S. immigrations system 
and later disseminating their findings from prisons in Central America.  The 
deportation process has turned into a sort of “merry-go-round” and in many 
cases a “taxpayer-financed visit with friends and family.”158   
The prisons in El Salvador have become “nerve centers” allowing for gang 
members from Los Angeles to communicate with members from cliques across 
the U.S. and Central America.159  Even our own prison system has become a 
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form of passive support.  Prisons offered a “finishing school” for gang members 
where hey learn criminal skills, later used to establish their illegal networks 
throughout the region160 
To maintain control, MS-13 has its own court system.  The court enforces 
the norms set forth by the directional component and deals with non-compliance 
by issuing a “green light” that sanctions the use of lethal force to deal with those 
who do not comply with the directives of MS-13.  For example, “the failure to pay 
the [protection] tax results in a green light allowing any affiliated gang to kill 
violators in jail, prison, or on the street.”161  This brutal enforcement mechanism 
allows the gang to ensure adherence to its “management vision” throughout the 
network.  Similar control through coercion and intimidation is exercised on the 
local population.   
MS-13 has its own “law enforcement” mechanisms by which 
underperforming or failing members face a “court” held by their peers.  This court 
determines the appropriate punishment based on the offense of the member.  
According to one report, the punishment could be one of three options:  a 13-
second beating, a 26-second beating, or a 36-second beating.  In cases where 
gang members cooperate with law enforcement, punishment by death is the 
clear option.162 
F. VULNERABILITIES AND CONCLUSION 
MS-13 is a good example of a Type-I dark network in the sense that it 
followed the basic principles of dark network design for its design state.  It is well 
configured with the following exceptions. Specifically, MS-13 does not adequately 
address the principles of security, capacity, agility and resilience. 
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First, MS-13 violates the principle of security.  In a network where 
membership is nearly unrestricted and the requirement for secure coordination of 
work is moderate, there are multiple opportunities for interdiction.  Since MS-13 
is less concerned with security than rapid growth and conducting action, 
admission into the gang is not restricted.  Once recruits are willing to be “jumped-
in” and prove their loyalty, they are in.  MS-13 includes multiple nationalities and 
cultural backgrounds.   If recruits can further the cause of MS-13, appealing to its 
reputation as the World’s Most Dangerous Gang, they can join.  This makes the 
gang vulnerable to penetration by not only law enforcement agencies, but also 
members of other dark networks, such as al-Qai’da or Hezbollah, that may seek 
to exploit MS-13’s vast smuggling network to illegally enter the United States.  If 
MS-13 is linked to terrorist organizations, then environmental hostility could 
increase exponentially. 
MS-13 also violates the principle of security with their lack of concern over 
detection.  This lack of concern stems from the fact that law enforcement efforts 
to combat them is not coordinated.  This lack of coordination exists both within 
the United States and with the partner nations with MS-13 activity.  The gang 
would be less resilient if faced with a more coordinated effort versus the limited 
regional approach that currently exists.   
Second, MS-13 violates the principle of capacity.  Many members are 
drawn to the gang merely due to lack of alternatives.  MS-13 offers a code, 
structure, and a family to disaffected poverty stricken, directionless youth.  
Programs in Mecklenburg, VA have already shown progress in reducing gang 
membership in one of the largest MS-13 clique locations.  An increase in such 
alternatives along with a coordinated effort across the United States and 
internationally (this includes reforms in the current deportation process which has 
proven to be more of a aid to the gang than a hindrance) could prove detrimental 
to further growth and success of MS-13.   
Third, reports have begun surfacing that MS-13 may be attempting to 
create a national command structure across the United States.  For a Type-I dark 
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network configuration, this is a trade-off where exerting more centralized control 
results in the violation of the principle of agility.  Becoming more centralized 
makes them less agile and more vulnerable to key target interdiction.   
Finally, an inherent vulnerability lies in mechanical configuration of a dark 
network like MS-13.  The loose-autonomous cells and decentralized action, while 
very adaptable and flexible for the network, also allow for simple misinformation 
to bring the network down.  Since the geographically defined MS-13 cliques to 
not all communicate with each other, it is possible they may not even know who 
the big players in the larger cliques (Los Angeles and N. Virginia) are.  Direction 
can be given to these smaller cliques to change action, change targets, or 
remove certain gangs from the “enemies” list in an effort to begin to reduce the 
levels of violence.  A network with this configuration is highly susceptible to 
penetration and information operations.163 
This chapter illustrated a Type-I Dark Network configuration:  
Opportunistic-Mechanical through the depiction of Mara Salvatrucha 13.  The 
opportunistic action and mechanical configuration allows this type of dark 
network to choose the most profitable crime for its given location while allowing 
for a directional configuration that allows each clique to operate as it sees fit in a 
given environment.  The configuration allows for great freedom of action, but it 
also leaves the network highly susceptible to illumination and interdiction.  It is 
the will and capacity of the regional law enforcement agencies as well as the lack 
of a coordinated effort that limit the successful interdiction of this type of dark 
network. 
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V. TYPE-II DARK NETWORK: RESTRICTIVE-ORGANIC 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 20.   Restrictive Organic Dark Network 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate an example of a dark network 
whose design state is defined by high environmental hostility and a moderate 
requirement for secure coordination of work that yields what we call Type-II 
Restrictive-Organic configuration.  Based on our theory of dark network design, 
the example shows how a Restrictive-Organic dark network is configured to 
achieve its purpose and how it is vulnerable to illumination and interdiction. 
Type-II dark networks can be the underground elements of a revolutionary 
movement that maintain a clandestine and covert lifestyle, emerge to conduct 
decisive action, and then return to the underground to avoid destruction.  These 
dark networks may remain geographically dispersed and apply layered security 
measures to buffer hostility.  There are many modern examples of networks that 
have a Restrictive-Organic configuration: Indonesia’s Jemmah Islamiyah (JI), the 
Haqqani network in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the South Florida-based anti-
Castro movement Alpha 66.   
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For our illustration of a Type-II dark network configuration, we use the 
ethno-nationalist insurgent network of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA).  We selected it over the others because of its transnational in nature; it 
most closely illustrates the typological design state of a Type-II dark network; and 
its prominence that provides a rich collection of open-source information on the 
dark network.    
B.  OVERVIEW OF THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), or Óglaigh na hÉirean in 
Irish, is a ethno-nationalist insurgent network based around Irish Irredentist 
goals.  The stated goal of the PIRA, nicknamed the “Provos,” was to end British 
rule of the six counties in Northern Ireland and unite the north with the Republic 
of Ireland. Though its goals were localized, its reach was transnational, utilizing 
the North American Irish Diaspora and the international terrorist community to 
develop a robust financial and material support network.  The PIRA formed in 
Northern Ireland in 1969 after a split from the main body of the Irish Republican 
Army over ideological issues and direction of the strategy of liberation.   
Throughout its history, the PIRA waged a protracted campaign of popular 
warfare against British forces in the face of British national and regional security 
services, as well as opposition protestant terrorist organizations, such as the 
Ulster Defense Force (UDF).  During the course of its armed campaign, 
estimates calculate that the PIRA killed approximately 1,800 people, including 
approximately 1,100 members of the British security forces.164   
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C.  TYPE II DESIGN STATE 
1.  High Hostility of the Environment 
The Type-II dark network operates in an environment with a high level of 
hostility.  A high level of environmental hostility exists when opposition elements 
possess the will and/or capacity to counter the dark network.  Opposition 
elements can commit varying degrees of resources to either suppress or destroy 
the dark network.  In the case of the PIRA, British and Loyalist forces efforts to 
eliminate the Provos dominated the environment.  Although the active members 
of the PIRA numbered about 400, they faced about 32,000 police and military 
force arrayed against them.165  The forces of the United Kingdom had 
international legitimacy on their side and used the legal system as a tool to limit 
the spread of the Provos influence.  Initially, the PIRA had a strong sense of 
legitimacy in the Catholic nationalist population and other Irish-Catholic diaspora 
throughout the world, but British security forces developed overt and covert 
mechanisms over time to undermine the PIRA’s embeddedness in the population 
and maintain pressure on their networks.   
The British military forces and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
conducted simple police work and overt tactical operations—such as roving 
check points, raids, and surveillance—in order to keep violence to a manageable 
level.166  The persistent presence of security forces throughout the operational 
area of the North and their coordination with the Guardia, the Irish Republic 
Police, kept the PIRA on the defensive.  Further, the use of clandestine methods 
such as agent infiltrations and electronic eavesdropping were effective for 
infiltrating some of the PIRA’s operations.   
The Provos also had rivals in the covert and clandestine world.  Loyalists 
formed citizens’ defense groups to counter the growing influence of the PIRA and 
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associated nationalist extremist groups.  Groups like the Ulster Defense 
Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) were responsible for more 
civilian casualties, usually those involved with supporting Catholic causes, than 
any other groups in the North.167  These loyalist groups were also involved in 
organized crime as a method of fundraising, which increased the points of 
competition, contention and rivalry with the PIRA.    
2.  Moderate Requirement for Secure Coordination of Work 
Type-II networks have a moderate requirement for the secure coordination 
of work because they maintain sanctuaries within the diaspora that are 
sympathetic to their activities and provide a space for operational planning and 
resourcing.  These sanctuaries provide temporary “safe areas” to escape 
environments with a high level of hostility.  This popular support base gives the 
network its resiliency. Opposition elements find it difficult, but not impossible, to 
penetrate theses sanctuaries in an effort to illuminate and interdict the dark 
network.  Since the risk of compromise still exists inside and outside of the 
sanctuaries, Type-II dark networks will employ moderate levels of clandestine 
and covert behavior and conduct decisive action using compartmented cells.  
Operating from sanctuaries in small elements allows the dark networks to the 
maximize secure coordination of work with a minimum expenditure of resources. 
The state’s concern about the rule of law and the perceived legitimacy of 
actions conducted state-sponsored oppositional elements can reduce the dark 
network’s requirement for secure coordination of work.  Since the level of 
repression by opposition elements was limited by the British legal system, the 
PIRA had a moderate requirement for secure coordination of work because it did 
not expect the application of Draconian control measures.  British society, with its 
interest in civil liberties, prevented the security forces from the use of effective 
repression and the use of widespread internment of known PIRA suspects.  The 
singular attempt at developing a limited gulag-style internment system in 1971 
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was a failure and political disaster for the United Kingdom.168  Although 
opposition elements may be constrained by rule of law to maintain legitimacy, 
they may have the will and capacity to commit extensive intelligence, military, 
and law enforcement assets to illuminate and interdict the dark network.  
Therefore, Type-II dark networks must develop appropriate mechanisms for 
secure coordination of work. 
The British Security Services were very adept in using the latest electronic 
eavesdropping technology.  Thus, telephonic communication, no matter how 
cryptic, was very perilous.  Personal clandestine communication was also 
hazardous. Therefore, the PIRA used basic non-technical impersonal 
communication techniques, such as emissaries or messengers, to pass 
information in short notes to conduct operations.169  These basic procedures 
provided a moderate level of secure coordination of work with a minimum 
expenditure of resources.  
D.  TYPE-II DARK NETWORK: RESTRICTIVE-ORGANIC 
We characterize Type-II dark networks as restrictive and organic for the 
following reasons: 
1. Restrictive Action  
Since the environment is has a high level of hostility, the network must 
restrict actions to those that are most effective and necessary for long-term 
survival.  Hostility influences action; limiting how, when, and where the network 
can act; and how successfully it can mobilize its support base.  To protect itself 
and build operational capacity, the network establishes sanctuaries from which to 
organize, plan, and recover from operations.  As mentioned earlier, these 
sanctuaries are nested within sympathetic populations that provide both active 
and passive support.  The strategic core uses the sanctuary to set the direction 
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and frame the purpose of the network in a manner that resonates with the 
members of the network and the population.  Meanwhile, the functional periphery 
directs and executes decisive action and support activities through its 
compartmented cellular structure and secure coordination infrastructure.  
Restricting action permits the dark network to conserve resources and develop 
the capacity to conduct decisive action to achieve its purpose in a hostile 
environment. 
2.  Organic Configuration  
In the organization design sense, an organic configuration is characterized 
by: 170 
• Flatness: communications and interactions are horizontal; 
• Low specialization: knowledge resides wherever it is most useful, 
and; 
• Decentralization: great deal of formal and informal participation in 
decision-making.  
From a dark network paradigm, the organic network that operates in an 
environment with a high level of hostility seeks to minimize the number of 
connections between core and peripheral components to maximize security.  
Thus, organic networks may set direction by disseminating a clear intent to be 
executed the dark network’s decentralize peripheral elements.  Network fail-safe 
mechanisms enable the secure coordination of work and allow the network to 
rapidly adapt to a dynamic, hostile environment.  Furthermore, the organic 
configuration allows the network to coordinate work in a secure manner over a 
wide geographical area, without the need for constant communications between 
the strategic core and peripheral operational and supportive elements. 
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E.  FUNDAMENTAL COMPONENTS 
 
Figure 21.   Illustration of Dark Network Components 
1. Directional Component 
The configuration of the PIRA’s directional component evolved because of 
network/organizational learning that drove them to relinquish a hierarchal form of 
organization for an agile networked structure.  The directional component of the 
PIRA originally mirrored conventional command hierarchy that had served the 
IRA through its push for Irish republican independence and the limited civil war.  
The PIRA morphed its configuration to a hybrid hierarchy/cellular network model 
after the 1974 cease-fire, when they realized that they were vulnerable to 
infiltration. 
Since British the security apparatus was highly practiced at penetration 
operations, the PIRA adopted a compartmentalized cellular network configuration 
to create a system of limited communications, which would limit the exposure of 




the operational unit, known as the Active Service Unit (ASU), would serve as the 
secure link to the core directors of the directional component.  As Horrigan and 
Taylor observed:171  
Each Volunteer in theory only knows the identity of the OC.  Each 
OC in theory knows only one higher authority, which is the Brigade 
Adjutant, who receives orders from a member of the GHQ [General 
Headquarters]/Army Council/Northern-Southern Command 
grouping.   
The overt elements of the PIRA/IRA, along with GHQ, represented the 
core directors. The OCs represented  PIRA’s peripheral directors.  For security 
purposes, the strategic key actors were detached from the peripheral key actors; 
locating in areas of known sanctuary that offered it the ability to conduct work 
with a limited threat of interdiction.  This limited communication forced the PIRA 
GHQ into a role of oversight with out control and allowed the ASUs greater 
autonomy (Figure 24).  
The core directors successfully tapped generations of resentment, 
humiliation and societal frustration by focusing on the strategic objectives of 
redressing a historic injustice.  This struggle for justice was the motivation that 
kept the “Provos” focused for 30 years of violent struggle.   
The PIRA articulated its overall strategic objectives to it members in The 
Green Book; a field training manual and policy manifesto that was used to 
indoctrinate new PIRA Volunteers: 172 
1. A war of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed at 
causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so as to 
create a demand from their people at home for their withdrawal. 
2. A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy’s financial 
interest in our country unprofitable while at the same time curbing 
long term financial investment in our country. 
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3. To make the Six Counties as at present and for the past several 
years ungovernable except by colonial military rule. 
4. To sustain the war and gain support for its ends by National and 
International propaganda and publicity campaigns. 
5. By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, 
collaborators and informers. 
The core directors set strategic policy, managed the PIRA’s ideology, 
dealt with macro level sustainment issues, and coordinated for international 
support.  PIRA’s core directors also controlled the transnational element of the 
strategy.  This transnational element focused on developing a bombing campaign 
in the Great Brittan and targeting British interests in Europe.173    
Along with the development of the cellular structure came the 
development of a more stable and static underground leadership which replaced 
the outmoded hierarchical Brigade system of the PIRA’s predecessors.  This 
development of the underground Army Council intended to provide strategic 
direction setting and a General Headquarters (GHQ) to conduct the macro scale 
coordination of operations, support, intelligence, to coordinate transnational 
activities.  This structure gave the PIRA a static cadre of key actors, who would 
focus strictly on supporting a protracted popular war of attrition.174  Under the 
GHQ, the PIRA developed a Northern Command, a peripheral director, that 
would coordinate with the ASUs to ensure they were working towards the same 
intent.  The node coordinated action and enforced PIRA directives.  A similar 
node was established in the South to coordinate active and passive support 
activities.  GHQ and Northern Command tried to exercise operational control by 
managing the distribution of weapons and finances, but this mechanism became 
vulnerable to infiltration (Figure 24).175 
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The peripheral directors of the PIRA’s directional component consisted of 
the various OCs that were dispersed throughout the network.  These OCs were 
responsible for taking ideology and intent and turning them in to quantifiable 
results through the actions operational element (Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22.   Illustration of PIRA Components Visualized in Palantir.176 
In an attempt to keep ASU operations focused on British and Loyalist 
security forces and mitigate sectarian violence, the directional component 
shaped its strategic message to indoctrinate its members and the world audience 
that the PIRA was conducting a legitimate war of national liberation.177  PIRA’s 
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political wing, Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone), set direction for the network and 
ensured that the PIRA ASUs considered the political objectives of mobilizing the 
Irish-Catholic ethno-centralism to win at the ballot box, as well as acts of 
calculated violence aimed at portraying the British as ineffective and incapable of 
providing security.  In order to maximize the political benefit of the duel political 
and armed struggle strategy promulgated through the “Armalite and Ballot box” 
paradigm, the strategic core exerted increasing control over the ASUs.178  The 
strategy was to nest ASU activities with the greater goals of the political wing.  By 
1986, Northern Command retained approval authority for any ASU seeking to 
execute an operation.179  This development sapped much of the creativity and 
unpredictability away from the ASUs by the early 1990s. 
2.  Operational Component  
The PIRA’s Active Service Units (ASUs) formed the core of its operational 
component and were responsible for conducting decisive action using both lethal 
and non-lethal means.  As a mentioned earlier, the PIRA adopted a cellular 
networked structure to conduct decisive action in early 1970s.  These cells were 
limited to four people; had a specialty, such as bombing, sniping or robbery; and 
were commissioned to operate regionally in order to widen their operational 
pattern. 180  These cells became the decisive action elements of the PIRA, which 
were all-channel cells of between eight and twelve members.  The PIRA’s 
operational concept initially allowed for great flexibility and bottom driven 
activities.  ASUs had the latitude to generate their own operational plans and 
support mechanisms at the local level, which will be discussed later.  
The PIRA’s operational component ensured operations were nested with 
the intent of the directional component’s strategic message.  This provided unity 
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of effort across the decentralized ASUs.  Thus, the PIRA’s organic configuration 
and compartmentalized cellular structure was effective in thwarting British 
attempts at interdicting the ASUs.  The Irish Police Service (Gardai) were 
frustrated by the this cellular compartmentalization: “We know the key personnel 
and activists and sympathizers who have come to our attention, but the cell 
structure is so tight that their own members wouldn't know the make-up of other 
cells.”181  When ASUs did work together, they coordinated operations through a 
liaison.  To maintain security, Volunteers used only first names or aliases.  As an 
additional security measure to confuse opposition elements, the PIRA would put 
younger, unknown Volunteers in positions of operational responsibility, while the 
higher profile members would become front men for more legitimate segments of 
the movement, such as Sinn Fein. 
3.  Supportive Component 
The PIRA’s supportive component conducted active and passive support 
activities from the local to the international level. The ASUs often develop their 
own direct support cells within the local area to get what they need on a day-to-
day basis.  The level of support varied widely depending on the tactical situation.  
Many ASUs depended on popular support within the sanctuaries and their own 
creativity to build infrastructure required to generate an ASU’s operational 
capacity.  The Provos’ vast support infrastructure included warehouses, safe 
houses, and caches throughout the 32 counties of the Republic of Ireland.  The 
PIRA also relied on allies in the United States, Basque separatists in Spain, and 
the regime of Momar Quadaffi to supply weapons and raw materials to equip  
their volunteers. 182  
The supportive component played a critical role in establishing and 
maintaining sanctuaries that provided a base of ideological and material support  
in both rural and urban settings.  The amount of popular support in a given area 
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often determined the operational capability of the local Provo units.  Many of the 
nationalist neighborhoods in the urban environment were “no-go” zones offered 
an environment where the opposition forces could not operate freely, thus 
mitigating the hostility in the environment and giving the opportunity to maintain a 
Provos a persistent presence.  These sanctuaries offered both active support 
and a general “halo” of toleration; a buffer of tactic support from sympathetic 
populations.183  Beyond these pockets of sanctuaries in urban centers such as 
Belfast, the rural environment offered pockets of strong support.  The border 
between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland offered an ease of passage 
which allowed volunteers and material to transit the two regions.  This 
gerrymandering of sympathetic populations allowed for the PIRA to move 
through areas of sanctuary throughout the countryside. 
The use of sanctuaries was vital to the active support of the PIRA.  The 
GHQ was located in Dublin, the PIRA quartermaster lived and worked in the 
Republic of Ireland, and many of the ASUs concealed themselves in 
neighborhoods or regions in the North that the PIRA controlled.184  This 
geographic sanctuary allowed for operational and support elements to conduct 
their work and learn best practices over time, with a reduced incidence of 
interception by hostile forces.  The PIRA focused most of their cache activities, 
improvised weapons manufacturing, and training camps in the Republic of 
Ireland under the auspices of the Southern Command.185  This sanctuary was 
possible due to the PIRA’s cultural embeddedness in the Irish-Catholic 
population.  Many of the disenfranchised Catholic minority in the North—a 
sizeable minority in the Republic of Ireland—and many of Irish descent in the 
international Diaspora shared the network’s goal of a unified Ireland free of 
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British influence.  Because of this ideological connection with the Irish cultural 
mindset, the PIRA was able to maintain a steady of flow of volunteers, weapons 
and money.186 
The supportive component also established an elaborate communications 
and early-warning system.  Many of the impersonal communication measures 
were very simple non-technical means of conveying information.  One example 
of these impersonal means of communications occurred when sympathizers who 
lived in a tall apartment building would spot approaching patrols with binoculars 
and they would hang a towel on their balcony or open a window to indicate that 
the security forces were in the area.187  The PIRA also used dead-drops, a type 
of cut-out, to indirectly the transfer written messages, as a method to limit 
exposure to British or Loyalist intelligence collection measures during 
operations.188   
Although the PIRA generally used lower technology solutions for 
transmitting information, there were instances that illustrated the PIRA’s desire to 
utilize higher technology to make their support of operations more efficient.  In 
1979, the RUC “discovered a hidden command post filled with radios, 
unscrambling equipment, sophisticated monitors, military style transmitters, 
position fixing devices and telephone taps routed through British Telecom 
network.”189  The PIRA used this equipment to eavesdrop on the British security 
services in order to stay a step ahead of them.  The use of advanced electronic 
devices, those rare were effective for PIRA operations and intelligence. 
For the PIRA, security was a paramount issue for the support elements 
and led to the development counterintelligence elements to ferret out informers 
and spies.  British and Loyalist security services were constantly infiltrating the 
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network in an attempt to illuminate and interdict the PIRA.  To counter this threat, 
the PIRA GHQ developed a security cell, which, was responsible for aggressive, 
independent, counterintelligence operation. This security cell was chartered to 
rooted out informants and vet new recruits into the network.190  In addition to 
hunting informants and vetting new recruits, the cell investigated security 
breaches and reviewed every botched mission to ascertain the likelihood that a 
security breach was the cause of the failure.191  This cell, known for its brutal 
interrogations in search of informants, had a ruthless clique known as the “nutting 
squad” that were known for shooting people in the head.192 
Ironically, the Provos’ most vulnerable element was the security cell.  The 
cell had the most extensive knowledge of the PIRA’s cellular organization, down 
to the recruit level, and the British Security Services made it a priority to infiltrate 
this element.  The British had at least three major sources within the security cell, 
two of whom were formerly in charge of the cell.193  One of the most damaging of 
these informants was Freddy “Scap” Scappaticci, the director of the security cell 
throughout the 1980s.194  From his vantage point he had knowledge of Volunteer 
identities, IRA operations and support networks.195   
The PIRA’s ability to finance operations was critical element for overall 
sustainability and used a loose collection of individuals that constituted their 
“finance department.”196  This finance department worked to find every angle, 
both licit and illicit to raise money for the movement.  The PIRA often used a 
cover for overt fundraising that went to funding decisive operations.  The PIRA 
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used front companies, like taxi companies, pubs, and drinking clubs in the North 
and in Republic.  Taxi companies and security firms were not only lucrative forms 
of financing, but also employed many volunteers, provided social services and 
provided cover for PIRA illicit activities.197   Many of these businesses would 
have PIRA accountants who could fiddle with the tax returns in order to funnel 
unaccounted for money to the PIRA. 
The PIRA’s support elements also consisted of a vigorous transnational 
support element. The PIRA was dependent on its international relationships to 
supply the organization with weapons.  The PIRA developed a strong relationship 
with the government of Libya, who supplied advanced weapons, explosives and 
hosted training events for PIRA volunteers.198 The PIRA also interfaced 
extensively with the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Party (ETA), who not only 
supplied the PIRA with weapons, but also pooled ideas, technology and 
training.199  Irish Republican sympathizers in the United States generated the 
most robust international support for the PIRA, collectively supplying the network 
with millions of dollars and the earliest supplies of assault rifles in the form of the 
Armalite AR-15.200   The largest contingent of American support came from an 
overt New York based group of sympathizers called Irish Northern Aid, or Noraid.  
Under the guise of a charity for the families of imprisoned PIRA Volunteers, 
Noraid supplied nearly half of the PIRAs operating budget in the early years of 
the network.201   
F.  CONCLUSION AND VULNERABILITIES  
The PIRA is a good example of a Type-II dark network in the sense that it 
was able to achieve its purpose despite the commitment British national assets to 
counter it.  The PIRA managed to configure itself and follow the principles of dark 
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network design. Its structure evolved to protect the operational wing of the 
movement while retaining a modicum of control and generating a robust support 
network.  Despite PIRA’s surviving in a hostile environment for over thirty years, 
the network did have vulnerabilities that were partially responsible for limiting its 
overall capacity.  Specifically, the PIRA violated or did not adequately address 
the principles of security and agility.   
First, in terms of the principle of security, PIRA centralized its security 
enforcement and counterintelligence apparatus in an effort to gain greater 
control, and to protect the network.  This apparatus had knowledge on the 
composition of the cellular network.  The broad knowledge base of this entity 
made it a tempting target for penetration by British and Loyalist forces.  As a 
result, PIRA’s security cell became a single point of multiple devastating security 
breaches.  
Increased efforts to control and coordinate strategy and operations could 
also created security lapses.  Since the PIRA conducted much of its coordination 
through the passing of indirect messages, a poorly worded note led to 
misunderstanding and failure.  Furthermore, compromised messengers or dead 
drops, led to the interception of operational plans and the planting of deception 
traps for the ASUs.   
Additionally, in developing stronger control measures, Northern command 
would occasionally force ASUs into sharing information and breaking their strict 
compartmentalization.  There were circumstances wherein Northern Command 
forced ASUs to coordinate and work together, even when it was a bad idea.  In 
one case, the ASU in South Armagh had developed a remote controlled 
detonator for their roadside bombs, which they did not want to share, as they 






Command forced the South Armagh ASU to share its technology with the rest of 
the network, and the British were able to discover it and developed an effective 
countermeasure.202   
Second, the PIRA violated the principle of agility.  The PIRA limited its 
network agility by attempting to maintain too much control over its disparate 
network cells.  As the PIRA looked at the increasing success of their political 
agenda, they needed to ensure that the ASUs were conducting operations that 
were in-line with the long-term political objectives.  Over time this control lead to 
the lessening of initiative at the OC level and a loss of effectiveness.  
In conclusion, Restrictive-Organic networks can be very effective forms of 
organizing armed resistance, but they are still vulnerable.  This network has an 
ability to plan and support operations, raise funds, and is deftly adaptive at 
mitigating the countermeasures of the oppositionist forces.  Those restrictive 
organic networks that have been the most successful were those who were able 
to develop areas of sanctuary that allowed permitted a safe environment for the 
directional component plan and coordinate operations and for the network to 
generate a base of ideological and material support.   
As an example the Restrictive-Organic dark network, the PIRA was 
effective in maintaining its efforts over the span of three decades.  But as the 
network evolved, experienced early success, and grew, the strategic core 
attempted to exert an increasing amount of control over the distributed cellular 
ASUs.  This focus on control sapped the network of effective security measures 
and network agility.  
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VI. TYPE-III DARK NETWORK: SELECTIVE-TECHNICAL 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 23.   Type-III Dark Network Quadrant 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate an example of a dark network 
whose design state is defined by a high requirement for secure coordination of 
work and moderate environmental hostility that yields what we call a Type-III: 
Selective-Technical dark configuration. 
Type-III dark networks can include the auxiliary component of an insurgent 
network, material supply chains, personnel recovery mechanisms, or other 
support networks that provide material and financial support to revolutionary 
movement.  Historical examples of this type of network include the French 
Resistance Allied pilot evacuation network in occupied Europe during World War 
II, al-Qa’ida’s training and support operations conducted in the Sudan in the mid 
1990s, and the global support network for Islamists conducting the global Salafi 
jihad. 
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For our illustration of a Type-III dark network configuration, we use 
Hezbollah's transnational support network, with a special emphasis on its 
operations in the Americas.  Hezbollah is multifaceted radical Shiite movement 
that conducts both licit and illicit activities throughout the world to achieve its 
purpose.  We chose Hezbollah because it is a transnational network with vast 
amounts of information available for research.  It also most closely illustrates the 
typological design state of a Type-III dark network. 
B.  OVERVIEW OF HEZBOLLAH 
Hezbollah203, or “Party of God,” originally formed in 1982 in the Bekaa 
valley of Lebanon.  It was created as reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
and was initially composed of small radical Shia groups inspired by the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran.  Most of its early leaders had connections to the Shia 
seminaries in Najaf, Iraq, where they were inspired by the radical teachings of 
Mohammed Baqr as-Sadr and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.204  Born in conflict, 
Hezbollah’s stated goals remain rooted in revolutionary thought.  The pillars of 
Hezbollah’s philosophy are the empowerment of Shiite nationalism in Lebanon 
and active resistance to the regional influence of state of Israel and its allies.205    
Hezbollah is one of the most powerful and diverse terrorist networks in the 
world.  It has the capacity to conduct a wide range of military activities from 
asymmetric, attacks such as suicide bombings and kidnappings, to more 
conventional large unit tactics, as seen in its limited war with Israel in 2006.  
Although Hezbollah is primarily viewed as a terrorist group by most of the world, 
it has also spent decades building a social service capability.  Hezbollah has won 
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a loyal support base through the provision of social services including health, 
education, and infrastructure in impoverished Shia areas during the decade long 
Lebanese civil war.206   
Although its operations focus on actions in the Middle East, Hezbollah has 
branched out its networks internationally to develop an effective global support 
presence.  One of the most important regions for Hezbollah’s financial support 
has been through its development of operations throughout Latin America.  Much 
of this expansion has been through the leveraging sympathetic elements in local 
Lebanese diasporas.  These diasporas have been very successful in regional 
commerce, and weak governmental controls on banking and business gives 
Hezbollah the ability to move money and supplies through transnational 
smuggling routes.  The Lebanese diasporas have become an important part of 
the fabric of the free trade zones in South America’s Northern Cone.  A large 
number of Lebanese moved to Latin America in 1948 after the Arab-Israeli War 
and again in the mid 1980’s to escape the Lebanese Civil War.207  Additionally, 
much of Hezbollah’s Latin expansion has mirrored the spreading influence of the 
Iranian government in the region.  Iran and Hezbollah use each other to expand 
their collective influence in the Western Hemisphere.  For example, Hezbollah 
agents were linked to the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy and the 1994 
bombing of the AMIA Jewish Center, both in Buenos Aries, Argentina208.  The 
use of worldwide Lebanese diasporas helps Hezbollah conduct massive fund 
raising ventures and provides a vehicle for future operations. 
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C.  TYPE III DESIGN STATE 
1.  Moderate Hostility of the Environment 
The Type-III operates in an environment that has a moderate level of 
hostility.  Hostility is moderate because opposition elements lack the will and/or 
capacity to counter the dark network.  The Type-III dark network operates in 
regions that are ill-governed and have a low capacity or will to enforce local laws 
or take the extensive measures necessary to interdict the dark networks.  Against 
this backdrop the Type-III dark network is able to maximize its potential for 
accomplishment of purpose. 
In the case of Hezbollah, the nature of the environment in Latin America 
presents a moderately hostile environment throughout the region.  Latin America, 
like other regions dominated by developing economies, is ripe for exploitation by 
clandestine and covert organizations.  This is due to endemic corruption, weak 
government institutions, ineffective or lack of intergovernmental cooperation, 
weak or non-existent legislation to deal with structural weaknesses, and a 
general reluctance to allocate adequate resources toward dealing with 
transnational terror and criminal groups. More commonly, the Selective-Technical 
operational component focuses on non-lethal operations to achieve their goal.  
Lethal or kinetic style operations tend to bring unwanted scrutiny from opposition 
groups and security forces.  Selective action ensures that the network remains 
below the military horizon and does not generate increased hostility in the 
environment.209  Lethal actions are usually only conducted as a defensive 
measure to protect supply lines, products, or to avoid destruction by opposition 
elements. The environment is moderately hostile to Hezbollah’s illicit activities in 
Latin America because the local governments are not the specified targets of 
Hezbollah’s lethal activities, despite pressure from the United States.  Since 
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there is no immediate threat, Latin American nations simply lack the urgency to 
deal with the issues revolving around terrorism financing issues and activities.210   
2.  High Requirement for Secure Coordination of Work 
Despite the moderate level of hostility in the environment, the Type-III dark 
network has a high requirement for the secure coordination of work.  This high 
requirement is due to desire of the network to ensure the aforementioned 
environment remains at a moderate level of hostility.  If their presence, or 
technology of work becomes known, the environment may become increasingly 
hostile.  In the business sense, Type-III dark networks must protect their 
proprietary information if they are going to retain their competitive advantage 
over their rivals. Additionally, the high requirement for secure coordination of 
work is due to the sequential interdependence of the work that is conducted by 
the Type-III network.  If one node of the network becomes compromised, 
repercussions will be felt throughout the rest of the network and can lead to 
catastrophic network failure.  Therefore, redundant and loose coupled  
mechanisms, as well as clandestine and covert behavior, are techniques to 
enhance network security and resilience.  A Type-III dark network generally 
conducts illicit activities to provide personnel, material, financial, and other 
support to develop capacity.  By developing human, physical, and virtual 
infrastructure Type III networks enable capacity for future decisive operations.  In 
the case of Hezbollah’s Latin American cells, the focus on both licit and illicit 
activities as a method of generating funding invites the scrutiny of security 
services and rival illicit cartels, therefore forcing the network to maintain a high 
requirement for the secure coordination of work.  
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D.  TYPE III DARK NETWORK: SELECTIVE-TECHNICAL 
We characterize Type-III dark networks as selective and technical for the 
following reasons. 
1.  Selective Action 
The Type-III network is selective in its action.  This network is conducting 
selective actions in geographically disparate regions, filling a specific niche, to 
assist the efforts of the overall network’s specifically defined end-state.  These 
selective actions might be fundraising activities, but also might consist of 
recruiting, equipping, training or even operations to weaken the international 
stature of an opponent.  In choosing specific areas such fundraising or recruiting, 
Hezbollah’s operations in Latin America are selective in nature.  
2.  Technical Configuration 
The Technical dark network often resembles a supply chain type of 
configuration that performs niche activities that typically require a high degree of 
technical skill or subject matter expertise.  This supply chain formation is can be 
called technical interdependence, as the entire network is interdependent on all 
the cells being able to perform their technically specific tasks.  The network 
operates in environments that have a moderate level of hostility and exploit the 
“white noise” afforded by local crime to conceal their true intent and enable the 
network to conduct lucrative operations with a modicum of opposition.  Technical 
networks are generally configured to produce a specific result; such as moving 
licit and illicit commodities to market in order to generate funds, provide material 
support, and to build capacity of the network to achieve its purpose.  The 
technical nature of these networks tends to cause the network to specialize in a 
niche and configure itself to optimize innovation and exploit the technical 
vulnerabilities of their intended targets. 
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E.  FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS 
 
Figure 24.   Illustration of Dark Network Components 
1.  Directional Component 
Hezbollah’s core directors in Lebanon set network’s strategic direction and 
objectives.  The core directors consist of a Secretary-General and a Deputy 
Secretary General who lead a seventeen member senior Shura, which oversees 
both the political and military wings of the militant group.211  Hezbollah has the 
capacity to conduct operations across the world, such as those in Latin America, 
through the peripheral directors who are embedded in the diasporas.  
Additionally, Hezbollah has long been a proxy for the Clerical regime in Iran.212  
Hezbollah’s core directors will often direct the network to on behalf of or in 
concert with Iranian interests. 
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In Latin America, Hezbollah’s cells maintain a member who focuses on 
Dawa, or missionary work.  Utilizing pro-Hezbollah propaganda via local 
mosques, the cell will work to proselytize local citizens and build a stronger 
indigenous network thereby developing a stronger sense of embeddedness in 
the diaspora communities.213  Like their compatriots in Lebanon, every unit has a 
religious or a “fighting cleric” element to enforce ideological adherence.214  These 
“fighting clerics” who are all trained in the tactics of guerrilla warfare, maintain a 
connection to the Hezbollah religious authority and enforce the power of the 
Shura throughout of the network.215  
2.  Operational Component 
Hezbollah’s Latin American operational components likely follow the 
general template for Hezbollah’s international action cells, which have three 
primary activities: 1) A Dawa and recruitment entity, based on Islamic clerics, 
religious centers and extremist propaganda; 2) A financing department whose 
capabilities based on the ability to raise money legally and illegally by using 
organized crime; 3) and an operational team, dealing with smuggling activists 
and means of warfare and the assembling of intelligence concerning potential 
targets.216  Hezbollah’s Latin American cells create long-term underground 
networks that develop operational plans and infrastructure, even as they are 
engaging in lucrative business ventures, both licit and illicit.  This permanent 
planning capability gives the network’s cells the operational agility to go from 
support to offense in at the most effective time, so they can maximize their 
results.217   
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Hezbollah places a high value on the virtue of self-sufficiency of the 
operational element.  They launched a number of their best and brightest young 
operatives in to the Latin American region.  These operatives, with no money and 
no outside assistance, deployed throughout Latin America to develop 
independent and compartmentalized networks with embeddedness in the local 
Lebanese and Arab diasporas.218  By having regional redundancy, these 
networks increase their ability to penetrate local markets and gain both financial 
and operational access to important sectors of the region.  By maintaining 
parallel circuit networks in the regional illicit trafficking market, Hezbollah 
maintains access to the same human trafficking routes that the drug smugglers 
use, allowing them to move operatives through the South and Central America at 
will.  
Hezbollah and other The Type-III dark networks use several different 
methods to ensure secure coordination of work, of which compartmentalization 
can be a primary tool.  This type of network sets its cellular network up in a 
circuit, through which materials travel or are transformed.  If opposition forces 
manage to compromise one of these cells, the network cuts ties to that node, and 
the circuit adjusts to circumvent the loss. One method of attempting the secure 
coordination of work is by setting up parallel circuits as a redundancy measure.  
These parallel circuits are compartmentalized and are not aware of each other’s 
existence. If one circuit is hampered, work-low can be shifted to another circuit. 
Type-III dark networks use elaborate deception to conceal their actual purpose 
from adversarial forces, for if their actions are discovered their infrastructure and 
activities can be easily interdicted, thereby eliminating the network as a viable 
structure. In the case of Hezbollah, the diasporas in Latin America engage in 
regional commerce through legitimate businesses, which provide cover for the 
network’s illicit activities in the region. 
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Hezbollah’s international cells constantly look for ways to innovate, 
through licit or illicit means.  Involvement in narcotics has become an important 
source of funding.  Hezbollah’s Latin American cells have developed inputs into 
the narcotics trafficking pipeline moving from the TBA north through Colombia 
and Venezuela, which contributes to the movement of 1.5 tons of cocaine per 
month.219  Outside of the TBA, Hezbollah’s Latin American cells have been 
associated with the Colombian insurgent group the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) and their access to transnational terrorism money pipeline.  
Members of Hezbollah have been known to work with the Colombian cartels and 
the FARC to smuggle cocaine to the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.  
According to Colombian officials associated with the investigation: "the profits 
from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah."220 
3.  Supportive Component 
Hezbollah’s Latin American cells embed into the regional Lebanese 
diasporas.  These Lebanese diasporas appear to be located in close proximity to 
financially lucrative free trade zones and border crossing cities throughout the 
region.  This facilitates money laundering and the movement of narcotics, 
weapons, people, and hard currency.  Specifically, Hezbollah elements are 
embedded in the Lebanese communities of Maicao, Colombia; Margarita Island, 
Venezuela; Iquique, Chile; and most notably the Tri-Border region.  Commonly 
known as the Tri-border Area (TBA), the region is an ill-governed space in South 
America where the borders of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil converge.  The 
TBA provides an environment in which terrorist cells can thrive: it provides 
sources of potential financing, access to illegal weapons and advanced 
technologies, and offers freedom of movement in a geographic area ideal for 
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camouflage and concealment.221  Hezbollah has invested heavily in the TBA, 
and has focused on the area since the early 1990s.  It is likely that Hezbollah has 
transnational networks throughout the Lebanese diasporas in Latin America in 
order more efficiently move people, funds and commodities.  
Hezbollah also takes advantage of the weak and corrupt governmental 
structures on the Colombian/Venezuelan border  In Venezuela, Hezbollah works 
through the large Arab population on Margarita Island.  The island, is a free trade 
zone and a known vacation destination for orthodox Muslims from around the 
world. Venezuelan internal security organizations were tracking a number groups 
or individuals associated with Hezbollah in the late 1990s and early 2000’s, but 
those investigations have ceased since the ascendency of the Chavez regime.  
Margarita Island provides an operational rear-area sanctuary for Hezbollah.  
Hezbollah’s Latin American activities have large direct and indirect support 
elements.  Some estimates indicate that Hezbollah receives around $10 million 
per month in direct support from its Iranian allies.222  This direct support also 
includes the support of Iranian capacity and alliances worldwide, such as 
Hezbollah’s Latin American cellular network. The strengthening of diplomatic 
relations between Iran and the Bolivarian axis of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Nicaragua gives Hezbollah’s cells a wider transnational basis of support. 
Historically, Iranian Embassies and cultural attaches have worked with members 
of the Latin American Lebanese diaspora to coordinate active support for 
Hezbollah operations in region.223  Further, the deepening of relationships within 
the region with Iran allows for a greater facilitation of Hezbollah’s freedom of 
movement.  Travelers entering Venezuela from Iran do not have to go through 
immigration controls and the Morales government recently lifted all visa 
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requirements for Iranians entering Bolivia.224 There are even reports that the 
Venezuelan minister of the Interior, Tarek El Aissami, was assisting in the 
recruitment of Venezuelans of Arab descent.  He is allegedly recruiting those 
who were supporters of the Chavez regime in order to send them to Hezbollah 
training camps in Lebanon and  Venezuela.225 
Direct support activities consist of the familiar pantheon of non-lethal 
activities such as bribery, information operations (propaganda), and infrastructure 
maintenance (warehousing and safe houses).  Indirect support garnered to the 
selective technical dark network is similar as that given to any criminal element: 
people, in their own self-interest, will often choose to ignore what is going on 
around them. 
Another example of indirect support for these cells includes funding 
through charitable donations.226  This type of funding is easy to produce and 
legitimize, and very difficult to track.  Charitable giving, or Zakat, allows for 
unwitting support of Hezbollah’s activities.  Money that one might think is going to 
a local education establishment or support to an orphanage is bundled in a 
package and sent back to Hezbollah to fund the cause.  
F.  VULNERABILITIES AND CONCLUSION 
Hezbollah’s operations in the Americas are representative of a Type-III 
configuration.  However, Hezbollah’s increasingly robust activity in Latin America 
generates vulnerabilities due to the violations of the principles of security and 
resilience.  These vulnerabilities come from their reliance on operatives with 
questionable tradecraft and a desire to maintain too much control over what 
should be completely decentralized and compartmented operations. 
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First, Hezbollah violates the principal of security.  Hezbollah’s Latin 
American network exchanges security for agility.  These cells are in a constant 
state of conducting ongoing support operations, while simultaneously developing 
operational contingency plans. Being a support and operational node 
simultaneously decreases security because the pre-mission activities are  
conducted by local operatives who possess varying abilities to utilize tradecraft, 
from excellent to incompetent.  Through incompetency, local security agencies 
have interdicted Hezbollah operatives conducting pre-mission surveillance on US 
Embassies in Asuncion, Cyprus, Russia and Spain.227  The loss of the operative 
in Asuncion, Paraguay, Sobhi Mamoud Fayad, cost the network an agent who 
had managed to raise $50 million.228  This idea that all the members of the 
network must take part in jihad exposes those with weak operational skills to 
interdictions. 
Furthermore, Hezbollah violates security through its reliance on the Latin 
American mosque network, which also sometimes functions as a control element 
for the network.  The use of Islam to build the dark network creates an indicator 
through which may serve as a start point to illuminate and interdict the network.  
Additionally knowing that maintains Hezbollah’s ties to Iranian activities, and that 
the Iranian regime maintains limited control over Hezbollah activities, one can 
watch the diplomatic activities of Iran in the region and likely be able to track the 
corresponding movements of Hezbollah movements.  For instance, after Iran 
established relations with Bolivia, one could track Hezbollah activists through the 
establishment of new mosques in that country.229 
Second, Hezbollah violates the principle of resilience.  The network trades 
resilience for control and maintaining too much direct oversight on operatives 
who should remain dispersed.  In 2008, Colombian police arrested a Lebanese 
crime kingpin in Bogota, named Chekry “Taliban” Harb.  Harb acted as the hub of 
                                            
227 Miryekta, “Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America.”  
228 Ibid. 
229 Karmon, Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah, 19. 
 116
an alliance between South American cocaine traffickers and Middle Eastern 
militants.230  His money laundering washed hundreds of millions of dollars a year, 
from Panama to Hong Kong, while paying a percentage to Hezbollah.  He 
developed a pattern due to his extensive travel to Lebanon and Syria, likely 
conducting meetings with his Hezbollah contacts.  More recently, Hezbollah 
operative Jameel Nasr, who was active in the Mexican border city of Tijuana, had 
taken frequent trips to Lebanon and Venezuela, to receive information and 
instructions.231  This travel created a profile that raised the interest of Mexican 
security services and invited undue scrutiny on Nasr. The Hezbollah core 
directors appear to be keeping very close and direct ties to their peripheral 
directors, which creates communication and travel patterns, which can lead to 
illumination.  These patterns become points by which opposition forces can 
illuminate the network. These operatives all have specific skills that, when lost, 
cannot be easily replicated. 
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities in of a Type-III dark network configuration 
have to with violations of the principals of security and resilience because of the 
network’s desire to exert greater control.  Although these Selective-Technical 
networks are effective in creating long duration clandestine and covert support 
mechanism, they are vulnerable to interdiction through the patterns they develop.   
While Type-III dark networks are often auxiliary or extended support 
mechanisms for other networks, they are, in the pure design example, essentially 
autonomous entities and develop a distinct structure according to their purpose.  
While they tend to be aligned with a primary ideology, that does not preclude 
them from facilitating the activities of other dark networks to generate funds or 
build strategic alliances.  They find sanctuary by blending into ill-governed areas 
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that have high levels of illicit activities, and thus are better able to conceal their 
activities.  By inserting Hezbollah agents into Lebanese diasporas and other 
organized crime groups throughout the Latin America, Hezbollah has been able 
develop long duration networks that are able to recruit, expand, self-sustain, 
generate resources for the greater larger network and prepare for decisive 
operations when directed by the strategic core. 
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VII. TYPE-IV DARK NETWORK: SURGICAL-AD HOC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 25.   Type-IV Dark Network Quadrant 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate an example of a dark network 
whose design state is defined by high environmental hostility and high 
requirements for the secure coordination of work that yields what we call the 
Type-IV Surgical-Ad Hoc configuration.   
Type-IV dark networks can include the action cells of high-risk operations 
used by terrorist organizations, insurgents, and state security services.  One 
example is the covert action team formed by the Israeli Mossad in response to 
the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre.  The response was initiated by the Mossad 
who formed several assassination teams with specific mission requirements.  
The teams used detailed planning, preparation, and covert communications to 
accomplish their objectives.  Another example is the Hamburg Network, 
responsible for the terrorist attacks carried out on September 11. 
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For our illustration of a Type-IV dark network configuration, we will use the 
Hamburg network.  We chose this dark network for our example because the 
network was transnational, there is a large amount of information and data 
available, and it most closely illustrates the typological design state of a Type-IV 
dark network. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE HAMBURG NETWORK 
The Hamburg Network was a group of 24 radical Islamists operating in 
five cells and responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The origins of the network 
lay with a study group at al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg, led by Mohammad 
Belfas.232  The group originally consisted of Mohamed Atta, Mounir Motassadeq, 
and Abdelghani Mzoudi who were all studying at the Technical University of 
Hamburg-Harburg (TUHH).  Over time, the study group grew to include Ramzi 
bin al-Shibh, Said Bahaji, Zaid Amir Jarrah, Zakarya Essabar and Marwan al-
Shehhi.  The actual “Hamburg Contingent” began out of this study group when 
Mohammed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Said Bahaji moved into an apartment 
together on 53 Marienstrasse, which they named “Bait al-Ansar” or “the House of 
the Supporters (of the Prophet).”233  It was there that the three held meetings to 
discuss their anti-American and anti-Israeli views and began trying to find ways 
to further their cause.234  With all eight associated through the study group led by 
Belfas and their increased social interaction through school, meetings, and 
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looking to join the jihad and go to Chechnya to fight the Russians.  It was not until 
they met Mohamadou Ould Slahi who encouraged them to travel to Afghanistan 
for training.235 
Prior to, and completely independent of the forming of the Hamburg 
Contingent, the plan for the “planes operation” was developing in the mind of 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM).  KSM knew that his plan for using airplanes in 
a terrorist attack on the United States required personnel, money, and logistical 
support that he did not have, but Usama bin Ladin did.  KSM knew he had to 
meet with bin Ladin because of he could provide the personnel, money, and 
logistical support required. KSM formally joined Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida in 
1998 after being given the green light for his “planes operation.”236 
With the arrival of the first three members of the Hamburg Contingent in 
Afghanistan, Usama bin Ladin was about to find the perfect group to lead the 
attack:  the members of the Hamburg Contingent spoke fluent English, were 
educated and knowledgeable of the western lifestyle, and were radical Islamists.  
In November of 1999, Mohamed Atta and his Hamburg Contingent became the 
strategic core of the dark network responsible for the 9/11 attacks.237   
C. TYPE IV DESIGN STATE 
1. High Hostility of the Environment 
This configuration results from a design state with high level of hostility in 
the environment.  The high level of hostility is typically due to a sophisticated 
“enemy”, such as the government of a nation-state with a well-resourced security 
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apparatus, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).  The environmental hostility level can also be attributed to the 
nature of the population.  If the population is against the purpose of the network, 
then the hostility is high.  
While it may not seem so at first glance, the Hamburg Network operated in 
an environment with a high level of hostility.  The environmental hostility in 
Hamburg was high because German security forces were monitoring them for 
their affiliation with known nodes of Islamist activity.  So, the Atta’s network 
ensured that their activities did not warrant any further attention or investigation.  
According to the 9/11 Commission, the Hamburg network changed their 
appearance to better fit with the Western society and they distanced themselves 
from Islamist nodes.238  Adoption of clandestine and covert behavior permitted 
the Hamburg Network to survive in a hostile environment and hide in plain sight. 
Hostility is the United States was also high, but the Hamburg network 
identified and exploited vulnerabilities in U.S. security apparatus to remain 
hidden and achieve its purpose.  Security measures, specifically with respect to 
aviation, were lackadaisical.  Passenger and baggage screening was not 
introduced until 1972 and was generally contracted to private security companies 
and oversight of the security measures was held by the Federal Aviation 
Administration.239  The airport security measures were also “hampered” by those 
who felt changes in procedures were discriminatory in nature.240  The 
lackadaisical security measures also existed within customs and immigration.  
According to the 9/11 Commission, “before 9/11, security concerns were not a 
major factor in visa issuance unless the applicant already was on a terrorist 
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watch list.”241  Because of these shortcomings in security and the fact that the 
selected 911 hijackers were not on a watch list, the dark network remained 
undetected had freedom of movement in both Hamburg and the United States.  
2. High Requirement for Secure Coordination of Work 
The high hostility in the environment also lends itself towards the high 
requirement for the secure coordination of work.  A Type-IV dark network is 
unable to operate openly for risk of detection and detention.  The high 
requirement for secure coordination of work results in more detailed planning, 
compartmentalization, use of coded transmissions, deception operations, and 
highly effective tradecraft in order to hide or mask activities.   
The Hamburg Network conducted varying degrees of clandestine and 
covert behavior activity to meet the high requirement for secure coordination of 
work.  In order to prevent compromise of the “planes operation”, the Hamburg 
network began distancing themselves from extremists, wearing western clothing, 
and even shaved their beards.242  The change in appearance also helped them 
during international travel.  Atta believed “that if the hijackers were clean shaven 
and well dressed, others would think them wealthy Saudis and give them less 
notice.”243  Some of the network members claimed they lost their passports and 
obtained new ones before applying for visas to enter the United States.  This was 
done to cover their previous travel to Afghanistan.244  It was through the secure 
coordination of work via covert and clandestine activity that the Hamburg 
Network was able to go relatively unnoticed by German and U.S. authorities. 
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D. TYPE-IV DARK NETWORK:  SURGICAL–AD HOC 
We characterize Type-IV dark networks as surgical and ad hoc for the 
following reasons. 
1. Surgical Action 
The activity of a Type-IV dark network is surgical in nature due to the high 
environmental hostility and the specificity of the intended action.  Planning must 
be precise and communications must be concealed.  These networks rely on a 
high level of clandestine and covert tradecraft to mask their true nature and 
identity in an effort to avoid detection.  For the Type-IV dark network to 
accomplish its purpose, it must be able to recruit candidates, properly vet and 
indoctrinate them, and train them, while avoiding detection.  Given the 
requirement for members to conduct pre-execution activities without being 
detected, the network must design itself to incorporate elaborate security 
measures to coordinate work and prevent catastrophic destruction.  Because of 
this, operational planning and preparation could take years.   
2. Ad Hoc Configuration   
According to Mintzberg, an adhocracy is a sophisticated configuration 
where the network is created “from different specialties into smoothly functioning 
project teams.”245  There are two types of adhocracy:  operating and 
administrative.  An operating adhocracy serves a client and an administrative 
adhocracy serves the organization, or network, itself.  In design terms, an 
adhocracy is a configuration with little formalization of behavior, horizontal job 
specialization based on formal training, a grouping of professional specialists in 
functional units, a reliance on a “liaison” to allow for mutual adjustment both 
within and between the units and finally a selective decentralization to the units 
which are located at various places in the organizations.246  Additionally, 
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members of an ad hoc network tend to be young.247  This fresh perspective and 
autonomy gives the ad hoc configuration agility and resiliency.  From the 
perspective of dark networks, an ad hoc configuration enhances security by 
providing cells an inherent multifunctional capacity to achieve its purpose.  This 
inherent capacity reduces the need for external connections and increases 
compartmentalization, thus increasing security. 
E. FUNDAMENTAL COMPONENTS 
 
Figure 26.   Illustration of Dark Network Components 
1. Directional Component 
The Hamburg Network began as a student study group at a mosque in 
Hamburg, Germany.  The core members of the group were Mohammed Atta, 
Ramzi Binashibh, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah.248  Their initial direction 
came from their “instructor,” Mohammad Belfas, who played an informal 
leadership role.  As the radical interests of the members grew, they began to 
                                            
247 Ibid., 338. replace and format 
248 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report, 160–165. 
 126
discuss plans and/or ways in which to further their cause, ultimately choosing to 
join the jihad.  The group was young and willing to be trained in specialized 
tasks.  Influenced by an individual with more time and connections to the Islamist 
movement and the jihad, they traveled to Afghanistan for paramilitary training.  
While there, they were identified as having all the skills and traits to execute a 
plan already being developed by Usama bin Ladin and Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed.  Once at this stage, strategic direction came from the larger 
organization of al-Qa’ida, namely Usama bin Ladin, and became the Hamburg 
Network.  In this sense, the Hamburg Network was an administrative adhocracy, 
with bin Ladin and Sheikh Mohammed forming the strategic core.  Within the cell, 
Mohamed Atta was the key player for operational planning and with the 
remaining actors of the cell, became a peripheral director responsible for 
executing the “planes operation.”  Together they operationalized the strategic 
ideology of the al-Qa’ida movement to achieve the network’s purpose:  strike the 
infidel.  It was through the “sponsorship” of al-Qa’ida’s core directors that the 
Hamburg Cell was able to carry out the operation designed by KSM.  Since this 
was a surgical–ad hoc dark network, day-to-day operations did not require a 
separate strategic ideology that differed from that of the global Salafi jihad.  
Therefore, the key actors of the Hamburg Network—namely, Atta, al-Shehhi, 
Jarrah, and later Hanjour—filled the roles of both core and peripheral directors 
for the execution of the 9/11 attacks. 
2. Operational Component 
The surgical nature of this network meant it was designed for a very 
specific task and the operational component of this dark network did exactly that. 
Within its operational component, the Hamburg Network conducted primarily 
lethal decisive action through the actions of the hijackers.  They physically took 
over the aircraft, killing crew members in the process, in order to use them as the 
weapons to destroy their targets.  The next example of lethal decisive action is 
easy to identify: the aircraft striking the World Trade Center towers and the 
Pentagon.  They failed to strike their suspected 4th target, the U.S. Capitol.  The 
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precision of planning within the operational component was also in line with the 
surgical nature of the network.  For example, at some point each hijacker 
travelled first class on an east-west transcontinental flight on the same type of 
aircraft he would be piloting on September 11. This planning continued in their 
ability to use banks within the United States to obtain the money used in their 
attacks.  According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “all of the hijackers opened 
accounts in their own name, and used passports and other identification 
documents that appeared valid.”249  While they were not experts, their careful 
planning allowed them to set up their access to financing.250  Further examples 
of the precise planning within the operational component, ranging from the 
research of flight schools to practice flights down the Hudson River corridor, are 
presented in the 9/11 Commission Report. 
Operational security of the Hamburg Network was a combination of 
compartmentalization, tradecraft, and the use of cut-outs.  The secure 
coordination and synchronization of output to achieve ideological objectives was 
achieved by the utilization of ties.  As a surgical-ad hoc dark network, the 
Hamburg Cell did not form new ties outside of the network without proper 
“vetting” or introductions (existing members, mentors, established al-Qa’ida 
members, Usama bin Ladin, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad appear to be the 
only people who introduced new ties to the network).  Also, they minimized ties 
within the network through compartmentalization.    Meetings were held with the 
use of cross-ties to “connect distant parts of the network to coordinate tasks and 
report progress.”  Following the meetings, these cross-ties would go dormant.251 
The network was surprisingly sparse and many of the actors within the 
same team were very “distant” from each other.  According to Krebs, “many pairs 
of team members [were] beyond the horizon of observability from each 
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other…keeping cell members distant from each other, and from other cells.”252  
This distance minimizes the possible damage resulting from the kill, capture or 
compromise of any single cell member.  Usama bin Ladin claimed “those who 
were trained to fly didn’t know the others.  One group of people did not know the 
other group.”253  The Hamburg Network was less able to adapt to changes in the 
environment due to the incredibly covert nature of their group and its operation.  
Direct and open communication between the members and their “leaders” was 
not possible.  They were already highly covert and “living in plain sight” which did 
not allow for much flexibility due to the risk of detection.  The Hamburg Network 
was resilient in the fact that its compromise would not cause the disintegration of 
their sponsor, al-Qa’ida, nor would it adversely impact the greater global Salafi 
jihad.  However, interdiction of the Hamburg Network itself would not have been 
survivable.  
3. Supportive Component 
The Hamburg Network had both active and passive support components.   
Because of the highly covert nature of the network, the flight instructors 
constitute active support.  While there were no obvious indicators to lead the 
flight instructors to suspect their students intended to use their knew skills in a 
terrorist plot, the instructors still played an active support role, albeit unwitting.  
This was partly possible due to another unwitting active support component, the 
U.S. Customs and Immigration office.  In February 2000, Atta and the other 
members chosen to be pilots for the attack claimed their passports were stolen 
and obtained new passports in order to cover incriminating stamps.  This allowed 
them to contact flight schools in the United States to obtain visas to enter the 
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country.254  Also included in the supportive component is the network’s ability to 
sustain its capacity to produce output.  Until taking the advice of Mohamadou 
Ould Slahi to go to Afghanistan for training, the group had minimal capacity.  
They were radicalized, but did not have the means to produce output.  They 
needed to join a jihad versus developing operations on their own.  Once they 
went to Afghanistan, they joined the greater cause of al-Qa’ida.  Their capacity to 
produce output was tied to this association.  The effort of the Hamburg Network 
was sustained by its association with Usama bin Ladin and through the logistical 
system (money and personnel) made available.  While there were nineteen total 
hijackers, there were multiple other accomplices who never got on an airplane. 
Individuals responsible for money, logistics, skill training at the terrorist training 
camps in Afghanistan—all are part of the active support component.   
Passive support components include the law enforcement agencies, 
schools and mosques that allowed the collusion of the members.  German law 
enforcement officials were watching the cell members, known to be radicalized 
students, who shared an apartment, knew they and others who visited attended a 
“study” group at the al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg, yet they did not share the 
information with other intelligence agencies.255   Long-term sustainability of an 
adhocracy has many unknowns.  As previously stated, an adhocracy does not 
know where or when its next job will come.  It can easily be overcome by 
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) without a capable internal or external logistical 
system. 
F.  VULNERABILITIES AND CONCLUSION 
While the Hamburg Network is presented as an example of the ideal 
configuration of a Type-IV dark network, there are still vulnerabilities where the 
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design type does not adequately follow the principles of design. The Hamburg 
Network is vulnerable in the areas of security, agility, resilience and capacity.  It 
is also vulnerable due to the surgical nature of its operation. 
First, it is vulnerable based on the principles of security and agility.  Covert 
networks trade efficiency for secrecy.  However, they have to coordinate through 
task-based communication.  It is during these periods of communication that they 
are vulnerable.  The Hamburg Network takes a seemingly calculated risk on the 
principle of security to ensure effective communications for control and direction 
setting.  Second, the network has cross-ties or transitory short-cuts256 that 
coordinate tasks and report on progress.  While the network as a whole may be 
compartmentalized, the actors who serve as cross-ties have more knowledge of 
the overall organization of the network.  Remove these actors, and task-based 
coordination cannot occur effectively and can uncover and/or foil the operation.  
Third, it is vulnerable on the principle of resilience.  Most adhocracies are young 
and its members have a tendency to die young or move on (as previously 
mentioned).  They never know where their next job will come from which could 
lead those on the periphery to shift to another type of network for greater stability 
or to fill their desire to be a bigger part of the cause.  
An additional vulnerability stems from the surgical aspect of this 
configuration.  A surgical operation requires specific skill sets.  As demonstrated 
by the Hamburg Network, internal ties tend to be most concentrated around the 
unique skill sets.  According to Krebs, “concentrating both unique skills and 
connectivity in the same nodes makes the network easier to disrupt.”257   
Finally, this configuration type is highly susceptible to misinformation and 
deception.  Due to the highly compartmented nature of the network, many do not 
know each other.  Planting seeds of mistrust within the network can lead 
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members of the network to doubt the overall direction of the network, which in 
turn could lead to defection from the network or possibly lead members to go to 
authorities and report on those they think may be reporting on them. 
This section illustrated the Type IV Dark Network Configuration:  Surgical–
Ad Hoc through the depiction of the Hamburg Network.  The high level of 
environmental hostility does not allow for much freedom of movement, therefore 
the surgical action and ad hoc configuration of this type of dark network require 
precise planning, clandestine and covert communications, and 
compartmentalization for the accomplishment of the network’s purpose.  
Because the Hamburg Network conducted tradecraft associated with clandestine 
and covert behavior, the network successfully avoided illumination and 
interdiction and achieved its purpose in an environment with a high level of 
hostility. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. A THEORY OF DARK NETWORK DESIGN 
We have defined dark networks as interdependent entities that use formal 
and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit activities and employ operational security 
measures and/or clandestine tradecraft techniques through varying degrees of 
overt, or more likely covert, activity to achieve their purpose.  Dark networks have 
natural configurations and that these configurations vary according to the 
network’s purpose and design state.  While no two networks are exactly alike, 
they have similar basic components that are configured to produce output 
through coordinated work in order to achieve a purpose.  Each dark network 
design, based on design state, configures itself through the arrangement of three 
fundamental components:  directional, operational, and supportive. 
The design state is determined by two dimensions: hostility of the 
environment and the requirement for the secure coordination of work.  From 
these dimensions, we presented the four dark network configurations or designs:  
Type-I:  Opportunistic-Mechanical; Type-II:  Restrictive-Organic; Type-III:  
Selective-Technical; and Type-IV:  Surgical-Ad Hoc.  The four dark networks 
presented in this study—Mara Salavatrucha 13, Provisional Irish Republican 
Army, Hezbollah in Latin America, and the Hamburg Network—offer illustrative 
examples of our four dark network configurations.  By illustrating the four dark 
network design types, we were able to present basic vulnerabilities of each after 
analyzing them using the six principles of dark network design: security, agility, 
resilience, direction setting, control, and capacity.  To the extent a dark network 
is not configured to address the level of hostility in its environment, or the 
requirement for secure coordination of work by adhering to the principles of dark 
network design, it becomes vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.   
 134
1. Environmental Hostility 
A dark network must configure itself to survive in the face of hostility.  
Hostility ranges from low to high, as presented in Chapter II.  While dark 
networks typically operate in a highly hostile environment, which in turn requires 
the network to employ strict security measures, some modern dark networks 
operate throughout the continuum.  In the four dark network configuration types 
presented in this research, the level of environmental hostility varied.  Type-I and 
Type-III operate in a moderate level of environmental hostility while Type-II and 
Type-IV operate in a high level of environmental hostility.  
a. Moderate Hostility 
In the case of the Type-I Opportunistic-Mechanical dark network, 
the moderate level of hostility in the environment is the result of the limitations of 
the state.  The dark network is aware that the state can (and will) only use a 
limited application of force to inhibit their efforts.  In the case of the Type-III 
Selective-Technical dark network, the moderate level of hostility is the result of 
their location, perhaps an ungoverned space or they may have the support of the 
population.  This typically provides freedom of movement and action for the 
network. 
b. High Hostility 
The Type-II Restrictive-Organic dark network is configured for high 
levels of environmental hostility.  The high level of hostility typically results from 
the network being in opposition to the governing state. The Type-IV Surgical-Ad 
Hoc dark network is configured for the highest level of environmental hostility.  It 
must configure to protect itself from constant risk of detection and attack as it is 
always being hunted. 
2. Secure Coordination of Work 
The secure coordination of work required by a dark network refers to its 
need and desire to commit resources in a way to achieve objectives without 
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detection and possible destruction.  The secure coordination of work permeates 
the dark network, enabling coordination between the directional, operational, and 
supportive components of the dark network to achieve its purpose.  The 
requirement for secure coordination of work is not always dependant on the level 
of hostility in the environment.  Type-I and Type-II dark networks have a 
moderate requirement for the secure coordination of work and Type-III and Type-
IV dark networks have a high requirement. 
a. Moderate Requirement for Secure Coordination of Work 
Despite the moderate level of hostility in the environment for the 
Type-I dark network, some amount of secure coordination is required for the 
accomplishment of purpose.  Regardless of the freedom of movement enjoyed 
by the network, it cannot survive if its operations and coordination are broadcast 
openly.  In the case of the Type-II dark network, the level of hostility in the 
environment is high, but the high level of support from the surrounding 
community allows for a liberal freedom of movement which in turn allows for 
moderate levels of secure coordination of work.  This type of network can 
maintain both a clandestine and covert lifestyle, emerge to conduct an act, and 
then return underground when threatened.  It thrives off the security provided by 
the support of the population.  As illustrated by Hezbollah in Latin America, 
support from the population, despite being considered a terrorist organization on 
the national stage allows for a tremendous amount of success. 
b. High Requirement for Secure Coordination of Work 
Both the Type-III and Type-IV dark networks require high levels of 
secure coordination of work.  With the Type-II dark network, while it enjoys 
freedom of movement due to its operations from a sanctuary or supportive 
population, its activities are highly illegal (smuggling, illegal financing, etc) and 
business cannot be conducted openly for risk of detection.  For a Type-IV dark 
network, the high level of environmental hostility and highly compartmented 
nature of the network naturally lend itself to the requirement of highly 
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compartmented and secure coordination of work.  As demonstrated by the 
Hamburg Network, ensuring all members did not have complete knowledge of 
the plan or complete knowledge of the membership of the cell conducting the 
operation protected it from the multiple set-backs that would have disrupted their 
plan had they been configured differently.   
3. Adherence to the Principles of Dark Network Design 
We show that regardless of design state, there are fundamental 
challenges that all dark networks must address.  From our two stated design 
dimensions as well as the body of literature examined in Chapter II, we identified 
six design challenges which we present as the principles of dark network design:  
security, agility, resilience, direction setting, control, and capacity.  Through our 
illustrative examples of each typological configuration, we have shown how each 
dark network addressed the six principles.  In the figure below, we present our 
findings based on the illustrative examples and whether they adequately 
addressed each principle of dark network design. 
Table 2.   Network Adherence to Principles of Dark Network Design 
 MS-13 PIRA HEZBOLLAH HAMBURG 
Security NO NO NO YES 
Agility NO NO YES NO 
Resilience NO YES NO NO 
Direction Setting YES YES YES YES 
Control YES YES YES YES 
Capacity NO YES YES NO 
 
While we did not make a specific indication of success or failure, we 
submit that failure to adhere to these six principles can have potentially fatal 
consequences.  It is through the examination of each dark network typological 
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configuration with respect to these design principles that we can identify potential 
vulnerabilities and provide possible recommendations for illumination and 
interdiction of the dark network. 
B. INSIGHTS FROM OUR RESEARCH 
Over the course of developing our theory of dark network design and 
analyzing our four illustrative examples, some insights emerged. First, networks 
are dynamic and will evolve over time. The environment in which these networks 
operate is not static; therefore in order to survive the networks must adapt to fit 
the environment.  Additionally, throughout the life cycle of the network, if it is 
successful, it will continue to grow.  According to Jones, cellular networks will 
“grow purposefully” and “as they grow, the leadership of the network 
decentralizes tactical decisions, but maintains operational and strategic 
control.”258  However, our study, as well as organizational design theory, further 
suggests that as a network grows and faces environmental hostility, it will tend to 
become more centralized in an effort to exert more control.  “To deal with crises, 
organizations tend to centralize at the top temporarily, and to suspend their 
standard operating procedures.”259  
 Second, there is a balance that must be achieved both within and outside 
of the network in order for it to survive.  With respect to the principles of dark 
network design, going to far in any one direction on one principle can result in the 
sacrifice of another.  Simply put, the overemphasis of one results in the detriment 
of another.  Pushing a network out of balance can create a vicious cycle leading 
to network failure.  For example, if the environmental hostility is increased on a 
Type-I dark network, it may be forced to exert more control and become more 
centralized.  In becoming more centralized, the network then becomes less 
resilient and agile and may develop security vulnerabilities.  If we can keep the 
                                            
258 Jones, Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Cellular Networks, 
30. 
259 Mintzberg, “Structure in 5’s,” 332. 
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dark network off balance and continue to push it towards a boundary, we can 
induce a vicious cycle leading to failure of the dark network. 
Keeping in mind the principles of dark network design as well as the 
insight that networks are dynamic and can be pushed out of balance, we can 
suppose possible strategies for illumination and interdiction of a dark network. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ILLUMINATION AND INTERDICTION 
1. Understand and Change the Environment 
In the examples presented for each type of dark network configuration, the 
importance of the environment on that configuration is critical.  Understanding the 
environment that the network has configured itself to maximize operations within 
and then changing it to make that configuration a mismatch will affect the mode 
of operation and/or the methods of communication and potentially illuminate the 
network.  In the case of a Type I dark network, which is most likely a known and 
visible illegal entity, but operating freely due to the lack of effective response from 
the state, changing the environment applies as well.  Looking at MS-13, one can 
observe that they operate freely as a result of law enforcement system that is 
neither networked nor coordinated and generally limited in its response 
capabilities.  Change that factor of the environment and MS-13’s configuration 
will be a mismatch, exposing it for more effective interdiction. 
2.  Exploit External and Internal Network Misalignment 
While the dark networks presented in the illustrative examples depict 
network configurations that are suited to achieve their purpose in their defined 
design state, opportunities exist to create or exploit vulnerabilities that make the 
networks susceptible to illumination and interdiction.  Most are neither perfectly 
designed to fit the environment, nor are they likely to continuously and strictly 
adhere to the necessary levels of secure coordination of work.  Put quite simply:  
everyone slips up at some point.  For this reason, each network configuration 
provides opportunities for exploitation. 
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A dark network is misaligned with the external environment when its 
purpose and design are diametrically opposed to the optimum design state.  
Strategies designed to increase uncertainty in the external environment, thus 
increasing hostility, forces the network to redesign to fit its changing environment.  
If the network lacks agility and is slow to adapt to its changing environment, then 
it is susceptible to illumination and interdiction.  If a nation-state or other 
legitimate authority increases its will and capacity to combat dark networks, then 
the dark networks become misaligned with their environment and have three 
basic options: reconcile, stay and fight, or run and hide.  Mitigating the 
antecedent conditions that enable dark networks to operate creates conditions 
that are unfavorable to achieve their desired purpose.  Removing the causal 
factors that push people into dark networks drastically reduces the places to 
hide, the network’s sources of ideological, personnel, and material support, and 
influences reconciliation.  Creating a caustic environment for the dark network 
allows legitimate authorities to focus their resources on illuminating and 
interdicting the remaining hard-core entities of the dark network. 
As previously explained, clandestine networks trade efficiency for secrecy, 
or vice versa.  Strategies that cause internal misalignment within the dark 
network reduce the network’s capacity for secure coordination of work to achieve 
its purpose.  We submit the following framework to generate internal 
vulnerabilities in dark networks: cause confusion, friction, gridlock, internal 
competition, and low performance with interdiction strategies that cause 
misalignments of the dark network's strategy, structure, processes and lateral 
capability, rewards systems, and people practices.  The resulting internal 
misalignment decreases the capacity for secure communication and 
coordination, which directly impacts the efficiency of a dark network.  In the case 
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), communications and 
coordination in a hostile environment was a problem.  In order to communicate, 
messengers and dead drops were utilized and one poorly worded note could 
lead to misunderstanding and in-turn lead to failure of an intended mission.  
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Interjecting unclear, misguided, and false information into the communications of 
a dark network can further destroy efficiency leading to them resort to more overt 
communications and therefore illuminating the network.   
3.  Develop Dark Counter-Networks  
It is critical to have the capacity to identify, understand, and defeat dark 
networks that pose a threat to U.S. national security.  Simply put, dark networks 
can be a tools for fighting opposition dark networks.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study had most likely generated more questions than it has answered 
due to the complexity of the subject.  For this reason, we hope it will serve as a 
catalyst for further research.   We offer the following recommendations for further 
study based on dark network design: 
1. Use of Geospatial, Temporal, and Network Analysis Tools 
Test aspects of our theory of dark network design using visual analytic 
tools to explore the geospatial, temporal, and network aspects of dark, 
light/bright, and gray networks.  These tools are useful for not only tracking and 
disrupting opposition dark networks, but also aid in modeling and testing the 
integrity of sanctioned dark networks.   
2. Deep-Dive Each Design State 
Conduct an in-depth case study comparison on dark networks within the 
same design state measured against concepts presented in our theory of dark 
network design to find common characteristics in their configurations.  
Subsequently, compare and contrast the common characteristics of each design 
state to determine correlations among the different components and sub-
component of dark networks as outlined in our models. 
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3. Research Gray Networks as Problems 
Conduct further research on gray networks as problems.  Gray networks 
appear to operate across a broader operational continuum and with a higher 
degree of complexity.  Their domain provides the setting that causes people to 
convert from passive to active support.  Gaining a better understanding of this 
domain can aid in developing strategies that are preemptive in nature to inhibit 
dark networks from metastasizing. 
4. Examine Unrestricted Dark Network Warfare 
Apply our theory of dark network design to develop and protect sanctioned 
dark networks to counter opposition dark networks and opposition nation-states 
that are a threat to U.S. national security.  Develop concepts for conducting 
unrestricted dark network warfare.  Based on the current state of the security 
environment, we posit that the networked-form of asymmetric clandestine and 
covert warfare between state and non-state actors will be the prevalent mode of 
conflict for the rest of the century.  With that in mind, we re-emphasize our core 
finding that “dark networks matter.” 
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